Sheriff Appeal Court refuses appeal against decree by default despite claimed medical explanation for procedural procrastination

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SAC (Civ) 47
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Appeal Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Principal N A Ross

A dispute concerning payment for a motor engine sold online led the seller to seek an action for the purchase price under simple procedure. After the buyer’s repeated, unexcused refusals to attend hearings led the sheriff to grant decree by default, an appeal against that decree came before the Sheriff Appeal Court.

The appeal was determined on the papers by Sheriff Principal Nigel Ross.

Repeated procedural delays

The respondent, a supplier of used 4x4 vehicles, sold a motor engine to the appellant through eBay. After complaining that a wiring loom in the engine required to be replaced, the appellant obtained a refund of the purchase price, £2,044, from eBay. In response, the respondent raised a simple procedure claim. It argued that it was only responsible for the working order of the engine itself, having not supplied a wiring loom, and now stood unpaid despite having delivered a fully operational engine.

After a hearing was fixed for October 2025, the appellant sought a sist of the proceedings for “at least six months”, citing various medical difficulties caused by sciatica. He claimed to be unable to walk unaided, or sit or stand for extended periods, and that medication affecting his expression left him incapable of “realistically respond[ing] to the claim”. At a remote hearing, the sheriff was unpersuaded by the appellant’s arguments and fixed a new substantive hearing for a month later.

The appellant made a new application, seeking to annul the sheriff’s order and request once more a six-month sist of the proceedings. Several grounds were advanced, with the appellant alleging that judicial bias and various procedural defects, such as the absence of a Portuguese interpreter, had deprived him of a fair hearing. Before that application could be heard, however, the appellant informed the court that he would not attend the scheduled procedural hearing. Should the court seek to make a determination against the appellant “incompatible with [his] state of health”, he threatened, he would raise the matter with the European Court of Human Rights.

A similar series of events followed suit in respect of a rescheduled procedural hearing in December 2025. Unlike on previous occasions, however, the remote hearing proceeded and resulted in the sheriff granting decree by default. The appellant’s absence, the sheriff found, had not been excused or justified.

Subsequent procedure resulted in the appellant’s application to recall the sheriff’s decree being refused, notwithstanding the production of a GP letter noting a marked worsening in the appellant’s condition. According to the letter, the appellant suffered from episodes of confusion, memory loss and speech difficulties, alongside severe restrictions on his mobility.

An appeal against the sheriff’s refusal to recall the decree came before the Sheriff Appeal Court. The appellant argued that allegations of procrastination on his part were “cruel and offensive”, that previous procedure had deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to participate, and that eBay ought to have been convened as a party to the action.

Apparent procrastination

Beginning his decision, Sheriff Principal Ross observed that: “The nature of simple procedure is a ‘court process designed to provide a speedy, inexpensive and informal way to resolve disputes’. This claim, by contrast, has been slow, wasteful and obstructed, entirely caused by the appellant. The claim was lodged and intimated by 15 April 2025. Hearings were fixed for 17 October 2025, 27 November 2025, 18 December 2025 and 9 April 2026. The appellant did not attend a single hearing, but was able to attend and participate in a motion hearing on 16 October 2025. A year passed with no progress. The respondent still has neither engine nor payment.”

Noting that “the appellant’s conduct of the action has appeared at times to be obstructive to the point of defiance”, he continued: “[The appellant] obtained several continuations by simply refusing to participate. He made no attempt or request for participation by other means, such as the assistance of a lay representative or the use of written submissions. The court made reasonable adjustments for illness by conducting every initial hearing by remote means. He could attend without leaving his house. Despite claiming to be hindered by lack of clear thinking, and a language barrier, the documentation produced was lengthy, sophisticated and loquacious. His medical condition was, despite his claims, far from vouched. It was a matter of assertion only. No court can accept the unilateral, subjective claim of one party in order to favour the rights and demands of one party over the rights of another party.”

Evaluating the sheriff’s refusal to recall the decree despite the late production of medical evidence, Sheriff Principal Ross added: “[The sheriff] assessed the long history of apparent procrastination, unevidenced claims of inability to engage, fully-explained submissions which claimed an inability to understand or fully participate, and the series of late and absolute refusals to engage with court proceedings. These were directly in opposition to, and tended to thwart, the principles of simple procedure. In these circumstances, the sheriff’s discretion to refuse recall of decree cannot be said to have been exercised unreasonably.”

Before adding for completeness that it was a matter for the parties, not the court, to convene eBay as a party to the action, he concluded that: “[The appellant’s] refusal to appear was absolute, unilateral and self-serving. His use of the phrase ‘I will not comply with any determination of the Court that is incompatible with my state of health’ showed an inflexible attitude and disdain for his responsibilities as a litigant. The respondent’s interests, meanwhile, remained entirely unaddressed.”

The appeal was accordingly refused, with the appellant found liable to the respondent in expenses.