Sheriff Appeal Court dismisses parent’s appeal against General Teaching Council’s refusal to remove ‘obsessive’ epithet from internal records

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SAC (Civ) 54
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Appeal Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Principal N A Ross

The appellant complained to the General Teaching Council for Scotland, believing teachers at his daughter’s school were involved in a conspiracy to conceal a continuing problem. After various requests under freedom of information and data protection legislation were refused, his case came before the Sheriff Appeal Court.

The appeal was determined by Sheriff Principal Nigel Ross.

Extended ‘obsessive’ campaign

The appellant made a complaint to his daughter’s school. Although the school addressed the problem complained of, the problem continued. Convinced that teachers at the school had falsified electronic records to conceal their shortcomings, he reported the teachers to the General Teaching Council for Scotland. Although metadata recovered from the school’s IT system showing retrospective alteration of records were submitted by the appellant to the GTC, it considered that the complaint was frivolous and did not merit investigation.

Further complaints to the GTC were eventually withdrawn, after the teaching council announced its decision to commission the Professional Standards Authority to review its processes in respect of fitness reviews. Nevertheless, the appellant submitted a freedom of information request in connection with that decision which was refused in July 2024. The request, according to the GTC, was unreasonable, disproportionate, excessively broad in its framing and formed part of “an extended campaign that could reasonably be described as obsessive” and “intended to cause disruption and annoyance”.

After attempts to seek internal review and appeal to the Scottish Information Commissioner were unsuccessful, the appellant raised a simple procedure claim for £750 against the GTC on account of its refusal to rectify its description of him in their records as, among other things, “obsessive”. On appeal to the Sheriff Appeal Court, the appellant argued that the sheriff had erred by failing to apply the correct legal test, as he perceived it; namely, to determine whether the personal data in question concerned matters of fact regarding motive, intention or behaviour and, if so, whether they were accurate.

Claim certainly not within scope of simple procedure

Sheriff Principal Nigel Ross began by noting the procedural limitations on the court in adjudicating on the appellant’s data-related grievances. He stated: “Simple procedure is ‘a court process designed to provide a speedy, inexpensive and informal way to resolve disputes’. The types of claim are strictly limited by section 72(3) of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. The only head capable of subsuming the present claim is ‘proceedings for payment of a sum of money not exceeding £5,000’. This claim is therefore limited to considering whether a sum of money is payable. The court may not adjudicate on any wider or different claim not within section 72(3).”

He continued: “The sheriff described this simple procedure claim as essentially an attempt to use data protection law to challenge reasons given for refusal of an FOI request. In substance that was correct, and to describe this simply as an action of payment of money created only a tenuous link with simple procedure … A claim under section 167 [of the Data Protection Act 2018] is for an order securing compliance with the data protection legislation. It requires an application to the court, and a determination. Simple procedure is not available to make an application seeking a determination under section 167. Such an application is not a claim for payment.”

Finding likewise that neither claims under sections 168 nor 170 of the 2018 Act were claims for payment, Sheriff Principal Ross added: “There can be no claim unless the statutory regime is complied with, according to the requirements of the 2018 Act … Even if [a claim for material or non-material damage under Article 82 of the UK GDPR] had been advanced, there was no basis to find that the sheriff erred in his decision that the disputed data was accurate and not requiring rectification. The data recorded the respondent’s opinion, itself based on rational assessment of material available. It was immaterial, for these purposes, whether that opinion was correct or not.”

He concluded: “Whether personal data is accurate or not must be determined in light of the purpose for which that data was recorded. The purpose for which the data was recorded in this case … was to explain the basis for an opinion. In the present case it was to explain reliance on section 14 of the 2001 Act in refusing to comply with the request for information. The respondent’s records explained why the request was considered vexatious, a value judgment based on facts. The data was an accurate record of reasons. The sheriff did not err in finding that the data was not inaccurate for the purposes of Article 16 of UK GDPR. As Nowak [v Data Protection Commissioner (2018)] described, the appellant would require to find his remedy elsewhere. That may involve challenge to and reduction of the decision, seeking rectification, or other remedy. It is not necessary to consider whether such remedy is available, or what it may be. It is certainly not within the scope of a simple procedure claim.”

The appeal was accordingly refused.