That unattractive curriculum vitae reflects the rise politically of Morès by incendiary rhetoric, the tactical and strategic use of intimidation, provocation, and violence, including the presence of Morès somewhere in the crowded shadows over the notorious Dreyfus affair.

Tiring of tedious military service in the French army, where he served for a few years, Morès went ranching on the American frontier and building a railway in Tonkin, in French Indochina – but his adventurous schemes failed, the first economically and the second politically.

Morès saw his failures in America as due to his being the victim of an economic oligopoly. In Asia he felt he had been a victim of a political oligopoly. In both of these he concluded there was Jewish influence. He resolved to sort the ‘problem’, not for himself but for the good of all.

The true cause of these disasters was Morès himself, by over-extending his initial investments and business expansions in difficult circumstances, and also competing with existing commercial interests which were well-entrenched and efficient.

Morès returned home to France, blaming supposed Jewish machinations for his financial defeats, not least with his bold business interests in New York. There was a hint in these ventures of a former cavalry officer participating in matters with neither the knowledge or ability required.

When Morès rose swiftly to political prominence, France in the 1880s was affected by difficult economic problems along with political nostalgia and uncertainty about the future course of government.

Others who, were less charismatic, had produced lengthy written works of antisemitism, and developing these Morès was able to begin his crusade on that theme openly and in a far more ‘athletic and muscular’ way.

Moreover, Morès was ahead of the general practices with his attention to his press coverage and media management: he fought a duel with pistols and injured his opponent and so he won. One journalist was present and he had, somewhat unusually, a camera to record events.

A later duel by sword led to the death of a fellow Army officer at the hand of Morès. The deceased was Jewish and after acquittal of a charge of murder Morès began his political career with a notoriety of prejudice that chimed with the times then.

The machinations of French high politics led to accusations of foreign involvement by prominent politicians based on sensational documents which were produced in parliament. The papers were soon shown to be forged and the involvement of Morès led to his downfall.

Morès had been subsidised by his father for years and the downfall coincided with the latter withdrawing his credit. It also became public knowledge that Morès had at one point borrowed a large sum of money from a Jewish financier.

A precipitous downfall in 1893 of the charismatic Marquis led somewhat slowly to a legend that extended to his rediscovery in Vichy France, nearly half a century later. The constant pursuit of adventures abroad of Morès led to his death in the desert in Algeria.

This fascinating biography narrates events with balance and restraint, although it is no mere narrative: there are 100 pages of footnotes covering a very wide range of authorities. The author, a professor of modern Italian history is well placed describe the flow of political ideas.

This is “a forgotten story of a forgotten man”, but not wholly so, as those who followed in his extreme ideological wake, and developed their theory and practices, were encouraged by the vitriolic fascism of Marquis de Morès: his line of political succession led to Mussolini.

The First Fascist: The Life and Legacy of the Marquis de Mores by Sergio Luzzatto. Published by Allen Lane, 488pp, £30.