High Court refuses church leader’s appeal against sexual offences conviction, reduces sentence
The Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary has refused an appeal by the founder and leader of a Pentecostal church against his conviction for sexual offences against members of his congregation, reducing by six years nevertheless his “excessive” custodial sentence.
About this case:
- Citation:[2026] HCJAC 27
- Judgment:
- Court:Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary
- Judge:Lord Matthews
The appellant was convicted of the sexual assault and attempted rape of two complainers, following allegations made by numerous members of his congregation. Arguing that his attempts to elicit evidence of a conspiracy to discredit him had been unjustly refused, he appealed against both his conviction and sentence.
The appeal was heard by the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Matthews and Lord Armstrong, with Mark Moir KC appearing for the appellant and Paul Harvey, advocate depute, for the Crown.
No evidence of conspiracy
The appellant, the founder and leader of a Pentecostal church, was convicted of sexual offences taking place against two complainers between 2006 and 2012. Evidence accepted by the jury made clear that the appellant had taken advantage of the position of trust he occupied within the church in the course of committing the offences.
At trial, the judge refused certain parts of the appellant’s application under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Through the application, the appellant had sought to elicit evidence that his complainers had conspired in their allegations to discredit him and remove him from his position in the church. Reversing the decision made at a preliminary hearing, the trial judge granted the Crown’s motion to refuse the application, being of the view that many of the matters referred to were “purely speculation, with no evidential basis”.
Following his conviction, the appellant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment in respect of the charge of attempted rape. A cumulo extended sentence of eight years, to be served consecutively and carrying a four-year custodial term, was likewise imposed in respect of the other charges. On appeal, the appellant challenged both his conviction and the sentence imposed.
The appellant submitted that the revocation of the section 275 application had prevented him from putting forward a proper defence to the charges against him, with the trial judge having been wrong to conclude that there was no evidential basis for the matters referred to in the application. Given the appellant’s position that he was innocent, it was reasonable, he submitted, to infer that the allegations of those encouraged to come forward were fabricated. His inability to do so had resulted in an unfair trial. For the Crown, it was submitted that the evidence did not support an inference of collusion and the trial judge was accordingly correct to refuse the application. Developments in the law following the UK Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Daly & Keir v HM Advocate did not, they said, assist the appellant.
An excessive sentence
Noting that the trial judge “was perfectly entitled to review” the appellant’s section 275 application, Lord Matthews began his decision by examining the appeal against conviction: “The simple point in this appeal is whether or not there is any evidential basis for the application. Unfortunately for the appellant, all that is available is his own supposition … Innocent men, such as the appellant says he was, will know that people who wrongly accuse them of crimes are lying or mistaken and can put that to them. Unless, however, they were party to discussions between accusers and others, they simply cannot know whether there were any discussions and if so, what their content was. The appellant was in no position to say that any discussions involved agreements to give false evidence. It is a line of defence which was completely speculative and the trial judge was quite correct to review and thereafter refuse those parts of the application which she did.”
Turning to the appeal against sentence, he continued by noting the basis of the appellant’s arguments: “It is said that the sentence was excessive. The appellant is now 62 years of age and has no previous convictions. It is accepted that there was a serious breach of trust in respect of both complainers, as we have already indicated … Other than the offences for which he was convicted, the appellant had led a prosocial lifestyle and had carried out a significant amount of commendable work within the community … He posed a moderate risk of sexual reoffending and had expressed a willingness to engage fully with suitable programmes within prison and after his release.”
Evaluating those arguments, Lord Matthews continued: “[T]he question for us is whether the sentence which was in fact imposed amounts to a miscarriage of justice, not whether in any particular respects the trial judge erred. Furthermore, while the notional sentences for individual charges have been challenged, the same issue arises. Was the sentence imposed in fact excessive? That cannot be said in relation to the sentence imposed on [the attempted rape charge] given the egregious breaches of trust involved. As far as the remaining charges are concerned, however, we consider that when the sentence is added to the sentence imposed on [the former charge], the result is excessive.”
In view of that finding, he concluded: “Had we been passing sentence on each of the charges individually, the custodial terms would have been 18 months on charge 1, 6 years on charge 2, and 2 years on each of charges 3 and 6. Making these consecutive would result in an excessive sentence. We propose therefore to quash the sentences imposed by the trial judge and in their place substitute a cumulo sentence covering all of the charges.”
The appeal against conviction was accordingly refused, with the substituted sentence, comprising an eight-year custodial term and four-year extension period, taking effect retroactively from 2 July 2025.



