Upper Tribunal rules valuation applications by seven Aberdeenshire businesses made out of time

About this case:

• Citation:
  2025UT82
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Upper Tribunal for Scotland
• Judge:
  Sheriff O'Carroll

Deans of Huntly Ltd and six other claimant companies sought to challenge the Assessor’s refusal to alter the roll, with the applications to appeal accepted by the First-tier Tribunal despite an argument from the Assessor that they were made late. On appeal to the UTS, the Assessor argued that the FTS erred in its construction of what constituted a “day” per the Valuation (Proposals Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 2022.

The appeal was considered by Sheriff Derek O’Carroll of the UTS, with written submissions made by the parties.

Common law day

At various times in 2024, each of the respondents submitted a proposal to the appellant seeking alteration of the Valuation Roll for their property. On 6 November 2024, the Appellant issued seven decision notices by email, one to each of the respondents, refusing the proposals. Those emails were received at various times between 17:41 and 19:37 on the same day. On 6 December 2025, each respondent sent an email submitting an appeal against their respective decision notices.

It was argued by the respondents that the 28-day time limit for the making of an appeal under the Regulations ran from the moment commencing 48 hours after the decision notices were sent, here at various times between 15:51 and 16:55, and expiring after exactly 28 periods of 24 hours to the minute. This argument was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal, which ruled that the appeals had been made timeously.

The appellant’s position was that the time limit began to run on the day of 8 November 2024, inclusive of the whole day, and expired at midnight on 5 December 2024. Accordingly, the appeals were in fact made one day late. It was accepted by all parties that, were the appeals to be late, the FTS had no power to extend the time limit.

It was submitted by the appellant that the FTS erred by holding that a “day” per the Regulations was not a common law day running from midnight to midnight. The tribunal wrongly inferred from the reference to the 48-hour period mentioned in regulation 18(5) to allow for the receipt of notice that the word “day” must be similarly construed as referring to a period of 24 hours starting from the time, rather than day, of presumed receipt. The regulations provided for two periods of time, one calculated from moment to moment and the other de die in diem.

Different connected purposes

In his decision, Sheriff O’Carroll began by noting: “The only purpose of regulation 18(5) is to provide a clear, definite starting point for commencement of the days of appeal provided for in regulation 18(2), where a notice of decision is actually sent. Both parties are agreed, correctly in my view, that the use by the legislature of a period of time measured in hours rather than days in regulation 18(5) means that the period is to be measured from moment to moment rather than from day to day). However, the period within which an appeal must be made is expressed and calculated differently in regulation 18(2).”

He explained further: “The period starts with a ‘day’, not with an ‘hour’ or a ‘time’. ‘Day’ is not defined in the regulations or the 1975 Act. That day, starting the days of appeal, is the day on which the notice of decision is presumed irrebuttably to have been received. And the whole of that day is included because the appeal must be made “within” the period of 28 days, so the first day of appeal is that day on which the notice of decision is presumed to have been received. That interpretation of the plain words of the regulation is consistent with the authorities.”

Evaluating whether there were special circumstances justifying an alternative calculation method, Sheriff O’Carroll said: “There are two different periods expressed deliberately in two different ways in different parts of regulation 18 for different purposes. There is no necessity or good reason to infer that day is to be understood as a period of 24 hours rather than a natural day. That is not what the regulation says. It is perfectly possible, as in this example, to have two time limits expressed by the legislation for two different but connected purposes expressed in different ways.”

He concluded: “It is further argued that the lack of any power for the tribunal to extend time argues for a more liberal construction where an appeal is just out of time. That argument has no merit. The task of the Tribunal is to construe the words of the legislature, give them meaning; not to read in an artificial construction to avoid what Parliament has decided. Counsel for the respondents candidly admitted that he was unable to discover any other reported decision, in this or any analogous field, in which the construction contended for was upheld. That I find unsurprising.”

Having found the appeals to the FTS were made one day late, the Upper Tribunal allowed the Assessor’s appeal, with the result that the respondents’ individual appeals to the FTS were each dismissed.