Solicitor seeking dismissal of complaints by Faculty and Law Society against him granted permission to appeal

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] CSIH 12
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Court of Session Inner House
• Judge:
  Lord Matthews

Patrick McAuley, who was issued a conditional practising certificate in 2024 following removal from the roll at his own instance in 2020, made a series of allegations in his application about the conduct of the Dean of Faculty, Roddy Dunlop KC, and the Law Society, alleging that there was a conspiracy against him on multiple fronts. On the second complaint, he argued that he was entitled to raise the possibility of a challenge under the Equality Act 2010 and on that basis alone the complaint ought to have been dismissed.

The applications were considered by Lord Matthews, Lady Carmichael, and Lord Braid. The applicant represented himself, while McGregor KC appeared for the SLCC as first respondent in both applications and D Blair, advocate, appeared for the Law Society in respect of the second application.

Anti-Catholic bigotry

In August 2024, the Dean of Faculty complained to the commission about Mr McAuley’s conduct. That complaint was deemed eligible and passed to the Law Society for investigation. Following that decision, Mr McAuley corresponded further with members of the Faculty and repeatedly accused them of falsifying evidence in the 2024 complaint, secretly conspiring against him, including to deny him pro bono representation. He was also said to have failed to act with trust and personal integrity when he applied for his practising certificate in neglecting to mention an Employment Tribunal case he had been involved in, McAuley v Ethigen Ltd (2023) in which an employment judge described his conduct as “scandalous, vexatious, and unreasonable”.

Mr McAuley challenged the decision on the first complaint on 14 grounds, including that as Mr Dunlop was not seeking compensation, the value of the complaint was nil and there was no interest to permit the commission to use. Mr Dunlop had improper motivations for the complaint and displayed anti-Catholic bigotry by using the term “papist” in a post on X/Twitter. The complaint about non-disclosure of the Employment Tribunal case was “deranged” because the case had been reported in the Scots Law Times, and at any rate the case was proceeding to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the quotes relating to his conduct would be removed from the public domain.

Delivering the opinion of the court, Lord Matthews said of the relative value of the complaint: “This argument proceeds on an erroneous equivalence between the legal principles applicable to inter partes litigation and those applicable to the discharge of functions by a statutory regulator. The commission was established by statute as a gateway body to sift complaints. Concepts such as ‘standing’, ‘title’ and ‘interest’ are inapplicable to the discharge of functions by a statutory body.”

He added on other grounds: “The allegation that the Dean’s complaint was motivated by sectarianism is conspicuously unsupported by evidence. The social media exchange which is referred to speaks for itself, as does the context in which it appears, but it does not, on the face of it, affect the substance of the complaint, which lies in communications from Mr McAuley himself. In any event such matters may be taken into account, if considered relevant, and if evidence emerges to support them, by the Law Society. For our own part, it seems plain that in using the words complained of by Mr McAuley, the Dean was quoting with disapproval words used in the Claim of Right.”

Lord Matthews concluded on this application: “The proposed appeal fails to engage properly with any of the section 21(4) grounds [of the Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007] and, for the reasons outlined above, has no prospects of success, realistic or otherwise. Leave to appeal is refused.”

Not unlawful threat

In respect of the second complaint, the Law Society referred to Mr McAuley’s submissions to its Practising Certificate Sub-Committee in August 2024 in which he threatened to raise proceedings under the Equality Act he was not granted an unconditional practising certificate. Ultimately, he was granted a conditional practising certificate, with the Inner House refusing an appeal against this decision in February 2025. The complaint also referred to correspondence between Mr McAuley and staff of the Law Society and the SLCC said to be apt to draw the profession into disrepute.

Mr McAuley argued that a threat to invoke Equality Act provisions was not an unlawful threat capable of amounting to misconduct. Drawing attention to the possibility of an appeal under those provisions was something he was entitled to do, and consequently the whole complaint should have been categorised as being without merit.

Considering whether Mr McAuley was entitled to refer to the Equality Act as he did, Lady Carmichael said: “The question for us is whether there is a real prospect of Mr McAuley’s arguing successfully on appeal that the Commission erred in law or acted irrationally in failing to conclude that correspondence in the terms quoted could never amount to a departure from the standards of conduct, such that it would be a waste of time for the Law Society to consider it. We are satisfied that there is such a prospect and therefore grant permission to appeal.”

On the other grounds of appeal, Lady Carmichael said: “Issue one proceeds on the basis that Mr McAuley’s correspondence includes unfounded allegations of serious wrongdoing, including racism, sectarian bigotry and malice. By way of example, the correspondence includes a description of a judge as a ‘racist beast’, and a description of the Law Society’s agent and of the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates as a ‘pair of racist and bigoted shysters’.”

She concluded: “The specification in issue three includes allegations that Mr McAuley attempted to mimic the employment judge’s voice or accent in a sarcastic and mocking manner, and that he used the noun ‘cheat’ to refer to the employment judge. There is no real prospect of Mr McAuley’s demonstrating that the conduct averred in issues one and three could never amount to a departure from the standards of conduct.”

Leave to appeal in the second complaint was therefore solely granted with respect to the argument on the Equality Act.