Social work student removed from register after abuse conviction loses appeal against panel decision

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SC DUN 5
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Timothy Niven-Smith

Kingsley Aigbe appealed under section 51 of the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001 against a decision of the respondent’s Fitness to Practice Panel dated 29 October 2024. He argued that a finding that witness AA, who had worked with him from 2 June to 7 September 2018, was an unsatisfactory witness ought to have resulted in her evidence being disregarded.

The appeal was heard by Sheriff Timothy Niven-Smith at Dundee Sheriff Court. B Langlands, advocate, appeared for the appellant and C Larkin, solicitor, for the respondent.

Credibility issue

On 4 June 2019, following a summary criminal trial, the appellant was convicted of behaving in a threatening and abusive manner towards his ex-partner, forcing entry to a property in Glasgow and repeatedly shouting at her. He did not notify the respondent of his conviction until 12 July 2019.

In addition, allegations had been made against him by AA, who had worked alongside him at Standard Care Recruitment Ltd, that he had repeatedly asked her to start a personal relationship with him, sent her harassing messages, and in September 2018 grabbed her by her trousers and slammed her against a car.

The respondents convened an independent FPP to consider the various allegations against the appellant. While the panel did not consider AA to be a satisfactory witness, it was able to accept parts of her evidence where it corroborated with the evidence that she produced of correspondence between herself and the appellant. These includes phrases such as “I love you”, and “you are the only woman I have ever fallen in love with”, as well as references to future marriage to AA.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the FPP erred in failing to take account of the fact that the panel recognised that there was a credibility issue with AA in making its decision. If AA’s allegations fell away, impairment to practice could only arise based on the conviction, which related to behaviour in 2018 that had not been repeated since. Esto sanction was still required, the court was invited to substitute removal with a six-month suspension.

Entirely legitimate approach

In his decision, Sheriff Niven-Smith began by noting: “It is important to stress -particularly for the appellant- that I am not engaged here in rehearing the facts. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for me to substitute my view of the evidence for those of the FPP if I come to a different assessment of the evidence from them.”

He added: “The decision of the FPP must be considered in its totality and not approached as if it were a commercial banking contract or conveyancing document by seizing upon a clause in the decision in isolation. The decision notice must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that it is addressed to parties aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced.”

Considering the panel’s approach to witness assessment, the sheriff said: “The FPP decision read in its totality gives the informed reader a clear understanding that the fact finders did have difficulty accepting the evidence of Miss AA in isolation but when they carried out a careful exercise of evaluating her evidence by reference to the totality of the evidence they found independent evidence which tended to support or confirm her evidence such that they were minded to accept her evidence. I can detect no error of approach to the process they embarked upon; it was an entirely legitimate one.”

He went on to say: “The FPP simply disregarded the evidence of the appellant unless it was supported by independent evidence which they accepted. The FPP were entitled to reject the evidence of the Appellant in the same way as it was entitled to reject the evidence of Miss AA (albeit it did not reject her evidence). In the generality, where evidence is rejected, it cannot prove the converse. Rejected evidence is simply that, rejected and left out of consideration.”

Sheriff Niven-Smith concluded: “In my view the FPP reached a decision which was open to them to reach, as stated previously the fact that I may have reached a different assessment is irrelevant absent being satisfied that the FFP reached a decision that no reasonable fact finder could reach. I am not so satisfied accordingly, the FPP were entitled on their assessment of the evidence to conclude that allegations 3b and 3c were established.”

The court having determined that the decision of the FPP was not plainly wrong, the appeal was refused.