Sheriff upholds council’s rejection of short-term let licence based on consideration of one objection

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SC ABE 18
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Andrew Miller

Kirk Harrison challenged a decision of Aberdeen City Council to refuse him a short-term let licence in terms of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (Licensing of Short Term Lets) Order 2022, which they rejected after considering the application in light of a single objection raised by a neighbour concerning waste and parking. The pursuer argued that the defender’s licensing committee had both erred in law and exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner.

The case was heard by Sheriff Andrew Miller in Aberdeen Sheriff Court, with the pursuer represented by Mr Kerr of his letting agency and the defender by Mr Noor, solicitor.

Undue public nuisance

In 2024, the pursuer submitted an application for a short-term let licence in relation to a four-bedroom property in Aberdeen, which he had previously used for that purpose for around 10 years. He intended that the property would accommodate up to six guests and had been granted planning consent for continued use as short-term accommodation by the defender in June 2024.

One objection was received from a member of the public living in the neighbourhood. According to the written statement of reasons from a meeting of the defender’s licensing committee on 29 August 2024, the objector had complained about poor management of waste and parking. In respect of waste, he said that the property’s refuse bins were overfilled on a regular basis and resulted in animals scattering refuse around the street at least once a month. With regard to parking, there was only space on the driveway for a single car despite the pursuer seeking a licence for up to six people.

The defender’s committee refused the application by six votes to three on the grounds of possibility of public nuisance. Before the sheriff, the pursuer argued that, at most, the objector’s complaints amounted to a private nuisance or mere discomfort, and the committee had erred by finding that they amounted to public nuisance. In respect of discretion, there had been no complaints of anti-social behaviour relating to the property and the committee had ignored the management procedures the pursuer had offered to introduce to address the objection.

For the defender it was submitted that the committee had a clear basis upon which to identify the issues relevant to the application. The 1982 Act did not define “undue public nuisance” for these purposes and in the context of this application, a nuisance which materially affected the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of the public, i.e. the others living on the street, could be aptly described as a public nuisance.

Clearly not reassured

In his decision, Sheriff Miller said of the relevant terminology: “In order for an activity to be regarded as a public nuisance, it must affect an identifiable class of the public. Although only one person objected to the pursuer’s application, he was a resident in a neighbouring property and the issues he raised were capable of affecting a class of the public, namely residents of the street. That appears to have been the view taken by the committee, having regard in its reasons to “the risks to the residents in terms of the possibility of public nuisance” (emphasis added).”

He continued: “According to Attorney General v PYA Quarries Limited (1957) the scope of public nuisance includes any nuisance which ‘materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life’ of a class of the public. According to Re Corby Group Litigation (2008), a public nuisance is ‘an unlawful act or omission which endangers the life, safety, health, property or comfort of the public’. These passages appear to indicate that the phrase ‘public nuisance’ is apt to cover a wide spectrum of potential impacts on an identifiable class of the public, from danger to life at one end of the scale to a material impact on the reasonable comfort and convenience of members of that class at the other.”

Considering whether the decision made was open to the defender, Sheriff Miller said: “I am not satisfied that the licensing committee exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. The committee had regard to a number of relevant considerations in reaching its decision, including not only the matters raised by the objector but Mr Kerr’s response, including his proposals for improvements to management procedures. The weight to be given to each of those considerations was a matter for the committee. The committee was clearly not reassured that the management procedures proposed by Mr Kerr on behalf of the pursuer would deal adequately in future with the issues raised by the objector.”

He concluded: “In an appeal of this nature the court must focus on the licensing committee’s decision-making process, recognising the importance of the committee’s role and of its local knowledge, in a general sense, of the significance of the issues raised in the context of the location with which the application was concerned. It is not open to the sheriff to conduct a review of the committee’s decision and to substitute their own view.”

The appeal was accordingly refused.