Sheriff Appeal Court upholds finding that defective LG phone caused house fire

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SAC (Civ) 70
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Appeal Court
• Judge:
  Appeal Sheriff L Nicolson

The court held that the sheriff had been entitled to find on the balance of probabilities that an incendiary fault in an LG K8 mobile phone caused the fire and that liability was established under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. It rejected LG’s contention that uncertainty over the position of a laptop charging nearby undermined that conclusion.

Pugh KC and Swanney, instructed by Thompsons Scotland LLP, appeared for Denise Parks. McGregor KC, instructed by Kennedys Law LLP, appeared for LG Electronics UK Ltd. The opinion of the court was delivered by Appeal Sheriff L Nicolson, sitting with Sheriff Principal N A Ross and Appeal Sheriff W Sheehan.

The action arose from a fire at Ms Parks’ home on 31 October 2018. She alleged that it was caused by an incendiary fault in an LG K8 (2017) mobile phone manufactured by LG and sought damages for personal injury and property damage under section 2 of the 1987 Act. Following proof in the All-Scotland Personal Injury Court, the sheriff found in July 2025 that the fire had been caused by the LG phone and that it was defective for the purposes of section 3(1) of the Act.

Three devices charging overnight

At the time of the fire there were three electronic devices nearby: the LG phone, a Samsung Galaxy S7 and an Acer Aspire ES 13 laptop. All three had been left charging overnight from the same extension socket. Ms Parks recalled that the two phones were on the arm of a sofa, but by the time of the proof she was uncertain where the laptop had been positioned. Her husband thought all three devices had probably been on the sofa arm but could not be certain.

Fire investigator Darren Green attended the property two days after the fire. His preliminary report recorded that Ms Parks had then told him that both phones and the laptop had been sitting on the arm of the sofa while charging. Mr Green examined the three devices. The laptop had suffered limited damage and most internal components had escaped fire damage, which he considered consistent with external fire attack. The Samsung similarly showed no internal battery fire damage.

The LG was markedly different. Most of its plastic body had been consumed, its battery was significantly swollen and had a hole at one corner, and the electrode material inside had burned. Mr Green considered this more consistent with burning originating within the battery and concluded that it was more likely than not that an incendiary fault in the LG caused the fire.

LG did not call its own expert at proof. The sheriff accepted Mr Green’s evidence and found that the LG was the source of ignition. He also preferred the account given by Ms Parks and her husband shortly after the fire on the positioning of the devices to their recollection more than five years later. The court also noted that LG’s own expert had examined the scene but was not called, and that Mr Green said the expert agreed the laptop was lying flat.

Appeal focused on position of laptop

LG advanced two grounds of appeal. Its principal argument was that there was insufficient evidence for the sheriff to find that the laptop had been lying flat on the sofa arm. It argued that the sheriff had failed adequately to explain why he regarded Ms Parks’ evidence at proof as unreliable but nevertheless accepted the account she had given to Mr Green shortly after the fire. 

LG maintained that the precise position of the laptop was central to excluding it as the source of ignition. Unless other possible positions and orientations had been investigated and excluded, LG argued, the sheriff could not safely conclude that the LG was responsible. Its second ground followed from the first: if the finding concerning the laptop’s position could not stand, neither could the findings that the LG caused the fire or that LG was liable under the 1987 Act.

Ms Parks submitted that the appeal placed too much emphasis on the laptop’s exact position. Her case rested principally on the physical evidence: the laptop and Samsung showed signs of external fire attack, while the internal damage to the LG battery was consistent with the fire originating there. She argued that it was unnecessary to investigate every conceivable position in which the laptop could have been located. Mr Green had considered different positions and said it made no material difference whether the laptop was on the sofa arm or slightly against it.

Finding on LG was a logical conclusion

The Sheriff Appeal Court refused the appeal. It held that the sheriff had considered the whole of the evidence and was entitled to accept Mr Green’s uncontradicted expert evidence concerning the patterns of damage to the three devices. The critical findings about the physical damage were not themselves challenged.

The Samsung and laptop exhibited patterns consistent with being attacked by an external fire, whereas the damage to the LG was consistent with it being the source. The court said that the sheriff’s conclusion that the LG caused the fire was therefore “a logical conclusion”.

The court rejected LG’s argument that Ms Parks was required to investigate and eliminate every possible configuration of the laptop before the LG could be identified as the probable source. That approach, it said, “would be to invert the onus of proof”. Mr Green had considered different positions for the laptop and evidence that sofa foam was adhered to its base was inconsistent with it having been vertical or on the floor. More importantly, his evidence was that whether the laptop was on the arm of the sofa or slightly against it was inconsequential to his conclusion.

The court distinguished the case from Rhesa Shipping, where a trial judge had felt compelled to choose between two theories which were both regarded as highly improbable. Here, the sheriff had asked whether the probable cause had positively been established rather than simply eliminating alternatives until only the least improbable remained.

The appeal court added that even if the disputed finding about the laptop’s exact position were disregarded, “the totality of the sheriff’s reasoning remains sound”. It also rejected LG’s challenge to the sheriff’s treatment of Ms Parks’ evidence. The sheriff had explained why he preferred the account given to Mr Green two days after the fire to recollections given more than five years later. The appeal court regarded that as a matter of “common sense and judicial methodology”.

The court reiterated that an appellate court must recognise the advantage enjoyed by the first-instance judge in assessing the totality of the evidence. Selecting individual passages was insufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff had been plainly wrong.

The appeal was therefore refused and the sheriff’s interlocutor of 18 July 2025 was adhered to. A separate hearing on expenses is to follow.