Sheriff Appeal Court rejects appeal against decision that union tweets about restaurant wages were defamatory

Sheriff Appeal Court rejects appeal against decision that union tweets about restaurant wages were defamatory

The Sheriff Appeal Court has refused an appeal by a trade union against a sheriff’s decision that tweets it posted about the wages of restaurant workers in Glasgow were defamatory of the restaurant’s parent company after finding that the sheriff was entitled to reach the conclusion he did about the content of the posts.

Unite the Union, the defender in an action raised by Ashton Properties (Glasgow) Ltd, argued that the sheriff ought to have dismissed the action based on its preliminary pleas and had erred in his approach to determining what an ordinary reader would understand from the posts. The pursuer and respondent contended that the sheriff’s reasoning was adequately explained and justified.

The appeal was heard by Sheriff Principal Aisha Anwar KC, with McBrearty KC and LC Kennedy, advocate, appearing for the appellant and Campbell, advocate, for the respondent.

Over-elaborate analysis

On 27 June 2023, the appellant published a post on Twitter and other social media platforms announcing that workers at Brel, a restaurant in Glasgow operated by the respondent, had been told that they would no longer be paid the Real Living Wage and would be reduced to the minimum wage. The post noted that the respondent had made £5.5 million in 2021, and was followed by a second post by the appellant’s employee Mr Simpson which stated: “This company makes millions from the hard work of our members who’ve been told they’re just not worth that extra 48p.”

The respondent contended that these tweets were defamatory in nature and that the ordinary reader would conclude that the wages of workers at Brel were being reduced. However, on 1 April 2023 the respondent increased the hourly wage of Brel employees from £9.90, the Real Living Wage prior to that date, to £10.42 per hour. The latter figure was in line with the National Living Wage for persons aged 23 and over but 48p short of the adjusted Real Living Wage as given by the Real Living Wage Foundation for that year. The new hourly rate, which was given to all employees including those under 23, therefore represented a pay increase.

Having considered the applicable legal principles, the sheriff found that the ordinary Twitter user would understand that Brel workers’ wages were to be cut, based on the natural meaning of the words used. While it might be known that the Real Living Wage was non-binding and more generous than the statutory minimum wage, the sheriff would not impute to the ordinary reader a detailed knowledge of the precise hourly rates prevailing from time to time.

For the appellant it was submitted that the first tweet was neutral as to the effect the change would have on the workers’ hourly pay. The ordinary meaning of the tweets was that Brel workers were told that their wages would be reduced from one wage scale to a lower one. The sheriff erred in his approach to the word “reduced” by holding that its proximity to the word “wage” invited the conclusion of a pay cut.

The respondent submitted that the appellant sought an over-elaborate analysis of the tweets to justify its contended meaning. Social media had been recognised by the courts as a causal medium which was pre-eminently one where the reader reads and passes on. Even if the present court interpreted the tweets differently, the sheriff had adequately explained his reasons.

Impressionistic and fleeting

In her decision, Sheriff Principal Anwar began by observing: “The appellant conceded that if the tweets bore the meaning the respondent contended for, they were defamatory of the respondent (in terms of section 1(4) of the Defamation and Malicious Publication (Scotland) Act 2021). Accordingly, it was not necessary for the sheriff to consider whether the meaning of the tweets was defamatory. The question before the sheriff was more narrowly focussed: what would the words used in the tweets convey to the ordinary reasonable reader?”

She continued: “It would be wrong to engage in an elaborate analysis of a 140-character tweet. It is unwise to parse a theoretical or logically deducible meaning. The imperative is to ascertain how a typical (ie ordinary reasonable) reader would interpret the message. That search should reflect the circumstance that this is a casual medium; it is in the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression; and it is pre-eminently one in which the reader reads and passes on. The reader does not pause and reflect. Their reaction to the post is impressionistic and fleeting.”

Considering whether the sheriff had erred in his approach, the Sheriff Principal said: “On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the sheriff had taken an overly impressionistic approach at the expense of a careful consideration of the word actually used. I do not agree that is so. He had particular regard to the language used, including the word ‘reduced’ and the references to the two pay scales. He was correct to attach significant weight to the words ‘reduced’ and ‘wages’ (albeit the word ‘wages’ appeared in reference to pay scales) which were apt to convey to the ordinary reasonable reader that the Brel employees were to receive a reduction in pay.”

She concluded: “The meaning contended for by the appellant is the product of a strained analysis. It would require the reader to pause and to contemplate the rate of pay prescribed by the two wage scales referred to, be aware of when these scales changed and then consider whether the effect of a change of pay scale was to increase or reduce the hourly rate of pay for the Brel employees. Readers of tweets do not generally pause and reflect nor ponder on what meaning a statement might possibly bear.”

The appeal was therefore refused, and the case remitted to the sheriff to proceed as accords.

Join more than 16,500 legal professionals in receiving our FREE daily email newsletter
Share icon
Share this article: