Sheriff Appeal Court dismisses buyer’s second claim for losses arising from same ‘cloned’ car purchase

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] SAC (Civ) 37
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Appeal Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Principal Andrew Miller

Pursuer and appellant Amin Abdalla bought the car from defender and respondent Robbie Sutherland for £5,000 in March 2025 and previously had the cost of the car awarded to him following procedure at Tain Sheriff Court. Mr Sutherland opposed the appeal on the basis that the sheriff’s decision to dismiss the second claim was correct.

The appeal was heard by Sheriff Principal Andrew Miller, with all parties representing themselves.

Already at the limit

Very soon after he had collected and paid for the car, the appellant requested a refund due to its mechanical condition and indications that efforts had been made to obscure the vehicle’s history by erasing its original Vehicle Identification Number and replacing it with a false one. Having been unable to resolve the issue with the respondent, the appellant brought a simple procedure claim in Tain Sheriff Court, resulting in the sheriff issuing an order for the respondent to pay £5,000 to the appellant and remove the vehicle from his possession.

In the appellant’s second claim before the same court, he sought to recover a further £4,397.17 from the respondent representing losses that arose in respect of storage fees, travel, accommodation, insurance and related expenses. The claim form directly stated that the losses arose from the same vehicle fraud and transaction as the first claim. This claim was dismissed by the sheriff at Tain on the basis that its subject matter ought to have been included in the first claim.

The appellant submitted that the first claim was subject to a financial limit of £5,000, which only covered the purchase price of the car. The consequential losses, in particular the storage costs of £3,683 from 17 June 2025 to 21 October 2025 (the date the car was uplifted by the respondent) had not yet crystallised by the time of the sheriff’s order in the first claim, although he acknowledged that less than a month of that period post-dated the first order.

In his note in relation to the appeal the sheriff at Tain, who had heard both claims, indicated that at the hearing in the first claim the appellant had sought to amend the sum sued for to add the additional costs to the first claim. That motion was refused as the claim was already at the simple procedure limit. The first claim could have been raised as an ordinary action, or alternatively an application could have been made to have the claim dealt with as an ordinary action.

One action rule

In his decision, Sheriff Principal Miller began: “Although he sought to recover separate losses in each of his claims, both claims essentially arose from the same ground of action relating to the sale of the same vehicle. The second claim thus fell foul of the ‘one action rule,’ in terms of which all heads of damage, past or anticipated, arising from the same cause of action (whether that is a delictual act or a breach of contract) must be sued for in one action.”

He continued: “The rule applies to anticipated future losses even where it may be impossible to precisely ascertain the amount of those losses at the time of the action in which they are claimed, and it applies even where the end result may appear to be harsh. It was therefore not open to Mr Abdalla to seek to recover, in separate simple procedure claims, separate losses relating to different periods of time, which all resulted from the same cause of action, namely the sale by Mr Sutherland to Mr Abdalla of this vehicle.”

Considering that the sheriff was bound to take notice of the issue in the second claim even when it was not directly raised by the respondent, the Sheriff Principal said: “Mr Abdalla should have included all of the sums he sought to recover arising from the sale of this car to him, whether past or anticipated, in a single claim. If the total sum claimed was above the simple procedure limit, the claim should have been raised as an ordinary action.”

He concluded: “If Mr Abdalla wished to increase the sum sued for in the first claim above the simple procedure limit during the course of that claim, the appropriate course would have been to apply to the court for an order to permit the claim to be dealt with as an ordinary action, in terms of section 80 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and rule 17.2 of the Simple Procedure Rules.”

The appeal was accordingly refused.