In round two of their public relations bout with the director of public prosecutions (DPP) the UK government (HMG) has come out swinging. It has published the three witness statements given by deputy national security adviser Matthew Collins which are at the heart of the contest. These are the statements which, according to the DPP, left him with no choice but to abandon the prosecution because they failed to furnish essential evidence that China posed an active threat to UK national security at the material time. It looks as if HMG has landed a punch.

The first of the three statements dated 22 December 2023 provides extensive details of the activities which formed the narrative of the espionage charges against the accused. This material was offered by the witness in support of the first essential element of the charge, namely whether the espionage here was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK.

The statement does not therefore directly concern the second essential element of the charge (the one in play here) - whether China posed an active threat to the national security of the UK when the alleged offences were committed. But this statement does touch on that point in paragraph six where the witness states: “The Chinese Intelligence Services are highly capable and conduct large scale espionage operations against the UK …to advance the Chinese state’s interests and harm the interests and security of the UK.” In paragraph 10 the witness states that this view is applicable to the period covered by the charges (December 2021 to February 2023).

In the second and third statements (21 February and 4 August 2025) the witness does address the vital question head on. He mentions (Stat.2 paragraph 5) Chinese sponsored large scale hacking operations targeting UK businesses and HMG “with potentially destructive consequences”. In the third statement (paragraph 4) he says that China’s espionage operations damage the UK economy “and the integrity of our democratic institutions”. In paragraph 6 he refers to HMG’s publicly articulated concerns during the relevant period (mentioned in my previous article) about the long-term and increasing Chinese espionage threat to the UK. In paragraph 7 he gives two examples of Chinese espionage campaigns and cyber attacks on the UK Electoral Commission and on MPs during the relevant period.

This evidence would probably be enough to take the case to the jury on the second key issue although it seems clear that a great deal more might have been said in the form of further examples. An evidentiary pedant might question whether it is inadmissible hearsay because the witness is essentially speaking to information passed on to him by the police and the security services. He does say in the second and third statement that he is speaking from personal knowledge but we can reasonably suppose he means his knowledge of what he has been told.

This does not appear to be the DPP’s beef about the evidence. He is not saying that HMG failed to provide statements from front-line officers or IT experts who do have first hand knowledge of the espionage/cyber attacks and their effects. It remains to be seen whether the DPP throws in the towel or whether he comes off the ropes with a more detailed description of what was lacking in the evidence contained in these statements.

As to the secondary spat between HMG and His Majesty’s opposition, the statements do not support HMG’s claim, repeated at PMQ this week, (which I criticised in my previous article) that they were prevented from offering evidence on the national security question because of the way in which the previous government had classified the Chinese state-sponsored activities in the Integrated Review of 2021. Mr Collins mentions these labels but this does not prevent him from describing the Chinese threats to UK national security summarised above. HMG has effectively contradicted its own position on this by publishing the statements.

One further interesting feature of the case is the as yet unsubstantiated allegation that HMG deliberately sabotaged the prosecution by withholding the vital evidence so as not to jeopardise their attempts to improve trade links with China (Mr Collins mentions that objective in the second and third witness statements).

If their primary objective is to avoid offending the Chinese it is difficult (not impossible) to believe that HMG would, during a period of heightened public interest in this matter, publish statements containing details of why they consider that China poses a long-term threat to UK national security.