Man recorded driving over 100mph with bald tyres has absolute discharge quashed by Sheriff Appeal Court

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] SAC (Crim) 8
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Appeal Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff S Reid

Mohammed Akhtar was initially charged on summary complaint with dangerous driving, but this was amended at trial to careless driving, to which he tendered a guilty plea. The Crown appealed against the disposal on the basis that, as careless driving was an offence involving obligatory endorsement, the sheriff was obliged to endorse the licence with particulars of the conviction.

The appeal was heard by Sheriff Principal Aisha Anwar KC with Appeal Sheriffs David Young KC and Stuart Reid. Keenan KC, advocate depute, appeared for the Crown and Deans, advocate, for the respondent.

Failed to afford opportunity

At 8.30pm on 7 November 2024, uniformed police officers in a marked police vehicle were travelling northbound on the A77 dual carriageway near to the Grassyards Interchange, Kilmarnock. The officers’ vehicle was overtaken by the respondent at speed in excess of the national speed limit. They followed the respondent, who at one point reached a speed of 103mph whilst overtaking other vehicles. The respondent was then stopped, and on inspection, the rear tyres of the respondent’s vehicle were found to be devoid of any tread.

No plea in mitigation for the respondent was invited or heard at the trial diet, during which the complaint of dangerous driving was amended to one of careless or reckless driving. In its original form, the minute of proceedings dated 15 August 2025, the date the plea was tendered, made no reference to special reasons or the issue of endorsement, but it was later amended to state that the court was unable to address the quality or standard of the accused’s driving from the Crown’s narration.

On appeal, the Crown submitted that the sheriff had failed to afford the Crown a proper opportunity to address the issue of special reasons. In any event, the narrated circumstances, though admittedly sparse, were enough to constitute the offence of careless driving. The sheriff ought not to have proceeded ex proprio motu, and the authorities he referred to in doing so were distinguishable as they involved convictions after trial and were decided before section 3ZA of the Road Traffic Act 1988 came into force.

For the respondent, it was submitted that the sheriff’s finding should be respected. If the appeal were to be upheld, and the issue of sentence were at large, the disposal of absolute discharge ought to be upheld or substituted with an admonition, with no more than three penalty points endorsed.

Fair opportunity to respond

Delivering the opinion of the court, Appeal Sheriff Reid said of the requirement for endorsement: “Where a person is convicted of an offence involving obligatory endorsement (such as careless driving), and no disqualification order is made in respect of the offence, the Court need not make an order for endorsement if, for special reasons, it thinks fit not to do so. A similarly worded formula exists under section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 which allows the court to refrain from imposing an obligatory period of disqualification if special reasons exist not to do so.”

He added: “There is no fixed rule that the sheriff cannot raise the issue of special reasons ex proprio motu (for example, by enquiring whether such reasons might exist) but, in that event, it remains for the accused to adopt and specifically to advance the submission – and the prosecutor must always be given a fair opportunity to respond to, and challenge, the submission.”

Explaining how the sheriff had fallen into error in this case, Appeal Sheriff Reid said: “If, after hearing the Crown narration in this case, a question had arisen in the sheriff’s mind as to whether special reasons might exist, he should have articulated that question expressly. Critically, he should then have afforded the defence the opportunity specifically to advance the submission, if so advised. In that event, the sheriff should then have afforded the prosecutor a fair opportunity to respond. From there, the procedure to be adopted would have depended upon the prosecutor’s response.”

He added: “The corrective docquet merely records that the sheriff was ‘unable to assess the quality or standard of the accused’s driving from the Crown narration’. That is not a special reason to refrain from ordering an obligatory endorsement. It is merely a complaint about the adequacy of a Crown narration.”

Sheriff Reid concluded: “Both the libel and the Crown narration amply disclose circumstances constituting careless driving (that is, driving without due care and attention), contrary to section 3, RTA 1988. Indeed, the libel (which must be taken to have been accepted by the respondent by virtue of his plea of guilty) would alone have sufficed.”

The court therefore quashed the sheriff’s disposal and instead ordered that the respondent be disqualified from driving for 22 months, reduced from 24 months by his guilty plea, and pay a fine of £1,125, discounted from £1,250.