Inner House upholds sist of Craig Murray challenge to Palestine Action proscription pending Supreme Court ruling

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] CSIH 45
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Court of Session Inner House
• Judge:
  Lord Tyre

The court comprised the Lord President, Lord Tyre and Lady Wise. The opinion of the court was delivered by Lord Tyre. O’Neill KC, Boni and Convery, instructed by Halliday Campbell WS, appeared for Murray. Lindsay KC, Maciver and Stephen, instructed by the Office of the Advocate General for Scotland, appeared for the respondent.  

In July 2025 the Home Secretary made the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, adding three organisations, including Palestine Action, to the list of organisations proscribed under the 2000 Act. Murray, who had previously expressed support for and participated in protest activities organised by Palestine Action, brought judicial review proceedings seeking among other things reduction of the order insofar as it applied to the organisation. Similar proceedings were brought in England and Wales by Palestine Action co-founder Huda Ammori and in Northern Ireland.

The present appeal did not concern the substantive legality of the proscription. It concerned the lord ordinary’s decisions to sist Murray’s petition until the Supreme Court determined Ammori and to refuse his request to report the whole Scottish case directly to the Inner House.

Parallel proceedings

Murray’s petition was lodged in October 2025 and permission to proceed was granted in January 2026 despite the more advanced proceedings in England and Wales. In February the High Court in England and Wales quashed the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action, holding among other things that the order amounted to an unjustified interference with rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed that decision in June, holding that the proscription was a justified interference with those rights. Permission was later granted for Ms Ammori to appeal to the Supreme Court, with an expedited hearing fixed for 4 and 5 November 2026. The lord ordinary ultimately concluded that Murray’s proceedings should remain sisted until the Supreme Court gave judgment. He considered this the most expeditious way of resolving several critical issues while minimising legal expense and the burden on court resources.

Murray challenged both the competency of imposing a sist in judicial review proceedings and the exercise of the lord ordinary’s discretion. He also argued that the case should instead have been reported to the Inner House so that it could be determined rapidly and potentially reach the Supreme Court alongside Ammori.

Inherent power to sist

The Inner House rejected the argument that the Court of Session lacked power to sist a judicial review unless the Rules of Court expressly authorised it. Lord Tyre said it was well established that Scottish courts possessed an inherent jurisdiction independent of specific rules of court. That included powers necessary to regulate proceedings and administer justice. The court considered there could be “no doubt” that this inherent jurisdiction included the power to impose or recall a sist.

Murray had relied on Rule 58.4, which requires the lord ordinary to have regard to the need for speedy determination of judicial review petitions, and argued that the rule displaced any wider inherent power.

The Inner House disagreed. Exclusion of the court’s inherent jurisdiction would require express provision, and neither the requirement for speedy determination nor the specific references to sists for legal aid achieved that. Lord Tyre added that, although pausing proceedings might initially appear inconsistent with speedy determination, circumstances could arise in which a sist actually promoted it. Waiting for an imminent authoritative judgment could avoid unnecessary proceedings, costs and duplication. The court therefore rejected Murray’s challenge to the competency of the sist.

Decision not ‘plainly wrong’

Murray separately argued that, even if the lord ordinary had power to sist the petition, his exercise of that discretion was “plainly wrong”. The Inner House acknowledged that almost a year had passed since the petition was lodged without a substantive hearing. However, it identified both the closed material procedure required in the Scottish proceedings and the developing English litigation as causes of the delay.

It rejected Murray’s allegation that the UK government had deliberately attempted to obstruct an independent Scottish challenge. By the time the lord ordinary decided to re-sist the case, the date of the expedited Supreme Court hearing was known. Lord Tyre said the judge had considered relevant factors including the quickest route to final determination, legal expense and efficient use of court resources.

The Supreme Court’s decision would not formally bind the Scottish courts, but it would be “highly persuasive” because it concerned the validity of an order applying throughout the United Kingdom. There was therefore nothing irrational about concluding that awaiting Ammori was the most expeditious course, with any unresolved issues capable of being dealt with afterwards in Murray’s petition.

The Inner House also observed that, if Murray considered that distinct Scottish arguments ought to be presented in Ammori, there was some force in the suggestion that he could seek permission to intervene in the Supreme Court proceedings rather than pursue separate litigation through several stages before potentially reaching the same court.

Attempt to bypass Outer House

Murray also challenged the refusal to report the entire case directly to the Inner House under Rule of Court 34.1. The Inner House noted that the power to report a whole cause had a long history, but appeared not to have been used since 1947. It did not exclude the possibility that reporting an entire case might still be competent in an appropriate situation, although such cases were likely to be rare.

Historically, the reporting procedure had generally been used to obtain authoritative guidance on an uncertain legal question or conflict of authority. Murray’s proposal was different. He sought to use the provision to remove the Outer House from the normal hierarchy and enable the Inner House to decide the judicial review at first instance, thereby making a rapid onward appeal to the Supreme Court more practicable.

Lord Tyre said Rule 34.1 had never been used for that purpose and that doing so would not be competent. If Scotland were to introduce a procedure allowing a stage of the judicial hierarchy to be bypassed, comparable to statutory “leapfrog” procedures elsewhere, specific provision would be required.

The lord ordinary had therefore been correct to refuse Murray’s request. Further procedure in the judicial review will be addressed after the Supreme Court gives its decision in Ammori.

The reclaiming motion was refused, with expenses reserved.