Inner House rejects appeal against adoption of nine-year-old removed from parents’ care after child abuse allegations

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] CSIH 25
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Court of Session Inner House
• Judge:
  Lord Malcolm

Petitioner AD sought to adopt the child EO after fostering him for almost five years following his removal from his parents by a local authority due to allegations of child abuse. EO’s mother argued that the judge had not carried out a global holistic evaluation of all the options open to him, and disproportionately interfered in his family life.

The appeal was heard by Lord Malcolm, Lord Doherty, and Lady Wise. Moynihan KC appeared for the petitioner and Scott KC and Conroy, solicitor-advocate, appeared for the respondent.

‘Limping’ adoption

In November 2016, just after his birth, EO’s parents came to Scotland while their home in Italy was being repaired after earthquake damage. When EO was five months old he and his older brothers were taken into care based on allegations of serious physical and emotional abuse made by the two oldest boys. It was also noted that the third child, who was seriously disabled, lost 12 teeth due to his parents’ inattention to his dental health.

EO was placed with a foster carer in Scotland and lived with her for almost five years. A decision was taken to proceed to permanence care planning for EO in September 2019. He began living with the petitioner, who shared his ethnicity and practiced Christianity albeit a different denomination to his parents, under a “foster to adopt” plan in December 2021. While the move was difficult at first, he gained a strong bond with the petitioner, who promoted a continuing relationship between him and his brothers, two of whom remained in Scotland.

After a contested proof, the lord ordinary granted an adoption order on the basis that it was necessary to safeguard and promote EO’s welfare throughout his life. In dispensing with parental consent, he found that they had shown no insight into their conduct and its impact on their children, and that their acquittal in criminal proceedings did not elide the cause for concern. They had been poor attenders at contact sessions, failed to engage with parenting assessments, and had embarked on a campaign of litigation based on procedural matters as opposed to substantive issues of child welfare.

It was submitted for the appellant that ought to have given further consideration to the effect of an adoption order, which was said to be a “limping” order in the sense that adoptions by a single parent would not be recognised in Italy, where they were considered against public policy, when compared against alternative orders available in England. The matter had been approached in a parochial manner, as if it were a purely Scottish case, rather than appropriately addressing any concerns around EO relating to his Italian citizenship.

For the petitioner it was submitted that the parents would simply continue litigation if the English courts were asked to assume responsibility for EO. This was not a true intercountry adoption as contemplated by Article 21 of UNCRC, which was a concept aimed at preventing child trafficking. The judge focused on safeguarding and promoting EO’s welfare, and his finding that his parents were unable to care for him was not challenged.

No silver bullet

Lord Malcolm, delivering the opinion of the court, said of the international element of the case: “Shortly before the hearing in this appeal the court drew parties’ attention to Judgment No 33 [2025] of the Constitutional Court of Italy. The Family Court of Florence had referred a question as to the constitutionality of the prohibition on single people resident in Italy applying for a decree of suitability for intercountry adoption. The referring court argued that a harmonious and stable family environment could be provided by a single-parent family network. The prohibition interfered with the goal of protecting the interests of the child and violated the right to respect for the private life of single people. These propositions were accepted by the Constitutional Court.”

He explained further: “While the judgment addressed restrictions on intercountry adoptions, it seems plain from its terms that it has broader ramifications and would be at least highly influential, more probably decisive, should the constitutionality of recognition of a single person adoption arise in another context. Of course, as counsel observed, any attempt to seek recognition and enforcement of the order in Italy is still likely to be contentious and the outcome uncertain. However claims of a ‘silver bullet’ do not survive the Constitutional Court’s judgment.”

Addressing the other grounds of appeal raised by the mother, Lord Malcolm said: “Any orders lesser than adoption available in England would mean that [EO’s] parents would retain residual parental rights and responsibilities, something which the judge considered, in our view correctly, as contrary to EO’s best interests. Making no order or anything less than an adoption order would deny EO the opportunity of being accepted by the petitioner as her son, legally and emotionally, for life, an outcome EO has made clear he wants.”

He concluded: “We see no merit in the submission that [the judge’s] assessment was one-sided and unfair on the parents. We have identified no errors or deficiencies in his overall approach, his reasoning, and the reliance on the key factors set out in paragraph 156 of the opinion. In the whole circumstances the judge was fully entitled to conclude that only the adoption order sought by the petitioner will provide EO with the security and stability he needs. The over-arching criticism that he failed to provide an adequately reasoned and clear proportionality and necessity analysis, sometimes termed a ‘global and holistic’ evaluation, is not accepted.”

The reclaiming motion was therefore refused, the court having found no merit in any of the grounds of appeal.