High Court rejects man’s self-defence argument in conviction appeal against attempted murder of brother

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] HCJAC 13
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary
• Judge:
  Lord Beckett

Patrick McGrow, known as David, received a 12-year extended sentence with a 10-year custodial term for assaulting his brother Andrew at his home in Glasgow in January 2024. He argued that the judge’s directions on self-defence in a quarrel were insufficient in a situation where, he claimed, the complainer was the first to use a weapon in their altercation.

The appeal was heard by the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Beckett, with Lord Matthews and Lord Clark. Collins, solicitor advocate, appeared for the appellant and Farrell, advocate depute, for the Crown.

Cruel excess of violence

On 13 January 2024, the appellant and his brother had an argument, with the trial judge reporting that there was evidence of a history of animosity between the brothers. The complainer invited his brother to return later that day so they could clear things up, at which point he was assaulted. While the complainer did not report what happened to the police, they became involved upon being contacted by staff at the hospital where the complainer, and later the appellant, were treated.

Evidence was led from a barmaid who spoke to the complainer leaving a local bar, uninjured, at around 5pm that day, and from the brothers’ mother, who received a phone call at 5:10pm from the complainer who stated, “Ma, I’ve been stabbed.” She went to the house and found the complainer seriously injured and unable to see out of one eye, whereupon she took him to hospital. The jury saw photographs of blood at the locus and heard from the senior charge nurse, who towards the end of cross-examination confirmed she knew what a defensive injury meant and in response to the appellant’s solicitor-advocate’s last question said, “It could be,” before being cut off, in respect of whether injuries to the appellant’s right hand were defensive.

It was submitted for the appellant that the evidence of injury to his hands and a nursing note that the appellant said he was the one attacked when taken into custody, allowed the jury to find that he had acted in self-defence. They were entitled to find that, although the appellant started the fight, the first use of a knife was by the complainer. The jury was left with the impression that the appellant could not plead self-defence because he started the fight.

For the Crown it was submitted that there was plainly a cruel excess of violence in the appellant’s actions given the minor injuries he sustained. There was an overheard statement that he had started the fight, which was of central importance. The judge did not direct the jury that an initial aggressor could not successfully claim self-defence, and that special defence remained before the jury. When the charge was read as a whole, and in the context of the evidence and speeches, there was no misdirection.

Intention to finish off

Delivering the opinion of the court, Lord Beckett reiterated the principle on special defences expounded in Crawford v HM Advocate (1950), saying: “There was no evidence whatsoever, nor basis to infer, that stabbing the complainer in the eye and slashing his neck was the appellant’s only resort. It is not sufficient for the appellant to assert, as he did in addressing the jury, that the Crown had led no evidence about possible means of escape. There required to be something in the evidence permitting the jury to reach the conclusion that there was no means reasonably open to the appellant to escape from any threat posed by the complainer. There was nothing.”

He added: “There was no basis in the evidence for the second of the three requirements for self-defence and therefore no basis for self-defence to remain before the jury. The trial judge should have directed the jury accordingly and withdrawn self-defence from the jury’s consideration. That is sufficient reason to conclude that there has been no material misdirection and no miscarriage of justice.”

Considering whether a jury could nevertheless find the appellant had acted in self-defence, Lord Beckett said: “We would not have been persuaded there was a miscarriage of justice given the strength of the evidence inferring a murderous assault and the paucity of any evidence to support self-defence. There was a plain disproportion between any violence that it could be inferred the complainer offered to that used by the appellant. Such evidence as there may have been in the appellant’s utterances was riddled with contradictions.”

He concluded: “Any impression that the appellant acted defensively is further undermined by his failure to take any action to secure medical assistance, his contemplation that his brother would be dead, his professed intention to finish him off and his carving a threat to similar effect on the complainer’s door. That said, whilst we repeat that it is not the appropriate criterion in this case, we would also conclude that there is no realistic possibility that fuller directions on self-defence in a quarrel would have prompted a different verdict.”

The appeal was accordingly refused.