High Court rejects defective representation appeal over decision not to seek admission of post-incident sexual evidence

High Court rejects defective representation appeal over decision not to seek admission of post-incident sexual evidence

The High Court of Justiciary has refused an appeal by a man convicted of raping his former partner who argued that his trial counsel had defectively failed to seek admission of further evidence about the pair’s sexual and non-sexual conduct after the alleged offence.

DMY maintained that, following the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Keir & Daly v HM Advocate, his counsel should have lodged an application under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 seeking to lead evidence that the complainer continued their relationship and had consensual sex with him days after the rape.

The appeal court held that the decision not to make such an application was a reasonable tactical judgment. The jury had already heard substantial evidence that the relationship continued after the incident, while the appellant’s own messages presented what the court described as his “biggest problem” at trial.

McConnachie KC, instructed by the Faculty Appeals Unit for Ross Harper Ltd, Glasgow, appeared for the appellant. Jessop KC (Sol Adv), AD, instructed by the Crown Agent, appeared for the Crown. The opinion of the court was delivered by the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Beckett, sitting with Lord Matthews and Lord Ericht.

Conviction after relationship continued

DMY was convicted at the High Court in Edinburgh of raping MN, his then partner, on 1 January 2022. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. MN told the court that after returning from a Hogmanay party she and DMY were in his bedroom when he repeatedly initiated sexual contact despite her saying no. She said that he ultimately penetrated her vaginally without consent.

The Crown relied in part on a Snapchat exchange from 3 January 2022. In it, DMY told MN that he had “got to a head of myself thinking u wanted something that u never” and said what happened “shouldn’t of ever happened”. MN responded that she never wanted to be in a position where she had said no to sex and it happened anyway. DMY replied that what he had done was “serious”.

MN nevertheless remained in contact with DMY for around 10 days after the incident. They exchanged numerous messages and telephone calls, she continued to express love for him and they spent time together. At trial, DMY denied rape and maintained that the sex on 1 January had been consensual. He said his subsequent apology was made because MN was upset, not because he was admitting non-consensual sex.

His counsel relied on evidence of the ongoing relationship in challenging MN’s credibility, arguing that her continued association with DMY was inconsistent with her account of rape.

Further conduct not put before jury

On appeal, DMY argued that counsel should have gone further.

He maintained that additional evidence existed showing that MN had continued a romantic and sexual relationship with him after 1 January. This included allegations that she invited him to a tattoo appointment, flirted with him, invited him into a bathroom while she showered and had consensual penetrative sex with him on 5 January. That material was subject to the statutory restrictions in sections 274 and 275 of the 1995 Act governing evidence concerning a complainer’s sexual history or behaviour.

DMY argued that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Keir & Daly v HM Advocate, a properly framed section 275 application would likely have been granted. His position was that the further evidence was important because it could support his account and undermine MN’s credibility. His trial counsel, Gordon Martin KC (Sol Adv), responded that he had been aware of some of the conduct but had made a tactical decision not to seek its admission. MN had already acknowledged continuing contact with DMY, and the jury heard further evidence from DMY and his mother about the relationship.

Counsel considered there was already ample material enabling the defence to argue that MN continued to associate affectionately with DMY after the incident. The appeal was ultimately advanced on the basis that failure to seek admission of the further evidence was conduct so unreasonable that no competent counsel could reasonably have adopted it.

Reasonable tactical decision

The appeal court held that the real issue was defective representation, rather than the proper interpretation of sections 274 and 275. Lord Beckett said it was not the law of evidence which had prevented the material from being placed before the jury. It was counsel’s tactical decision, made with knowledge of MN’s evidence on commission, not to apply to introduce further material about the parties’ continuing association.

The court emphasised the significance of the Snapchat exchange. It described the case as unusual because there was “a relatively clear written admission in an electronic message by the appellant that he raped the complainer”. That, the court said, was his “biggest problem in the trial” and would not have been materially improved by showing that consensual intercourse took place several days afterwards.

The messages also recorded MN expressly telling DMY that she had said no but sex had happened regardless, followed by his response accepting the seriousness of what he had done. The court regarded that exchange as strongly supportive of MN’s account. The defence of consent had in any event been before the jury. MN had been cross-examined about it, DMY gave evidence that intercourse was consensual, counsel addressed the jury on that basis and the trial judge gave directions on the issue.

The appeal court therefore held that the decision not to lead the additional material fell within the professional judgment open to experienced trial counsel. The court also doubted how much additional assistance the proposed evidence would have provided. The jury knew that MN continued to see and message DMY after 1 January, that she remained in love with him and that she regarded them as still being in a relationship. They also knew there had been a large volume of communication between them.

Against that background, the judges said they “struggle[d] to conclude” that evidence of consensual sex on 5 January or the other proposed conduct would have been materially more effective than the evidence already available to the jury concerning the continuing relationship. The appeal amounted, at most, to an allegation that the defence “might have fared better if counsel had pursued a certain line of evidence or argument or pursued a different strategy”.

That did not amount to defective representation. There had been no miscarriage of justice. The court added that it was “far from certain” that a section 275 application would have been granted in any event.

Because MN had already acknowledged extensive post-incident interaction and continuing affection, the probative value of questioning her about specific sexual activity was reduced. The principal purpose of the proposed evidence was to demonstrate her feelings towards DMY after the alleged rape, but the jury already knew about those feelings from her evidence, messages and testimony from the defence. Going further into particular sexual acts would have been “highly invasive of her privacy and dignity”, the court said.

It was therefore not a foregone conclusion that a judge would have held that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the administration-of-justice considerations under section 275(1)(c). The court concluded that trial counsel’s tactical decision was one reasonably open to him and was itself reasonable. The appeal was refused.

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