Former Scottish clerk of court loses appeal against conviction for fraudulently acquiring sole title to Florida property

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] HCJAC 30
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary
• Judge:
  Lord Clark

Shamshad Adams challenged her conviction on the grounds that the Crown had failed in its duty of disclosure to her and the sheriff had erred in refusing a motion to dismiss the trial based on that non-disclosure. She further argued that the sheriff had misdirected the jury on the necessary components of the offence that required to be proved.

The appeal was heard in the appeal court of the High Court of Justiciary by the Lord Justice General, Lord Pentland, with Lord Doherty and Lord Clark. Culross, advocate, appeared for the appellant and Harvey, advocate depute, for the Crown.

Disguising of an issue

In July 2019, the appellant’s relationship with her partner, Gordon Laing, broke down. The two had jointly purchased a property in The Villages, Florida, on 30 May 2017. The appellant maintained that the purchase was funded entirely by her, and that the reason title was taken jointly was to enable Mr Laing to use resort facilities which proprietors were entitled to use. In a text messages exchange with Mr Laing on 12 July 2019, the appellant told him that she was going to sell the property and stated that she wanted to “see him suffer”.

An American law firm, McLin and Burnsed, was instructed in relation to the sale and sent a Quit Claim Deed, a type of deed commonly used in non-sale title transfers, to an email address used by a mutual friend of the appellant’s and Mr Laing’s, R. The deed was then returned to the firm bearing a signature purported to be Mr Laing’s and a stamp of the Justice of the Peace Court in Kirkcaldy, which the appellant had applied. Based on this deed, the Sumter County Court in Florida granted transfer of title to the appellant. When Mr Laing’s solicitor discovered the existence of the deed, which he had not signed, the matter was reported to the police.

During the trial, the Crown received a document said to be a “warranty deed” for the sale of the property to a Micky L Halburnt annotated with the words “sold for 265,000 dollars on 23/10/19”. This was handed to the procurator fiscal depute shortly prior to cross-examination of the appellant by a police officer who had been given it by Mr Laing, whose evidence had previously been completed. While no objection was initially made to this new evidence, the defence later made a motion to desert based on the appellant not having an adequate opportunity to consider her position on this evidence. The sheriff repelled the motion and considered that any prejudice could be redressed by a re-examination of the appellant.

For the appellant it was submitted that the information in the deed was important, and the opportunity to deal with it during examination in chief was lost. In a jury trial, the impression that there had been a disguising of an issue in that it was only discussed in cross-examination was important, particularly in a trial that centred around credibility and reliability on an allegation with dishonesty at its core. Additionally, the Crown had made an erroneous reference to a third party in their closing address, which had not been resolved adequately in the sheriff’s directions to the jury.

The advocate depute submitted for the Crown that, while the manner in which the document came to be disclosed was regrettable, it was not apparent that the jury would have perceived anything untoward in the appellant being asked questions in re-examination, as was allowed by the sheriff. On the third party’s involvement, the position was that the jury could reasonably infer that the appellant had prevailed R to act on her behalf, but it was clear that the Crown was not suggesting R was criminally responsible.

Many convincing strands

Lord Clark, delivering the opinion of the court, said of the Crown’s non-disclosure: “In the submissions put before the court, the key theme for the appellant was that the non-disclosure affected her credibility and reliability. It is therefore necessary to consider the other evidence. The Crown relied on a substantial body of circumstantial evidence regarding the signing and stamping of the Quit Claim Deed by the appellant.”

He then outlined that evidence: “There was evidence from court staff that the appellant was in the Justice of the Peace Court in Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court when the document was stamped. One staff member was suspicious when she saw the Quit Claim Deed dated 19 July 2019 and was ‘100% sure’ it was not signed legitimately. It is agreed that the appellant was working there on that day. The jury could infer that the solicitors in the USA were instructed by the appellant and drafted the document. The witness Gordon Laing gave evidence that he had not signed the deed. Two forensic scientists gave evidence that it was likely that another individual was responsible for the handwriting.”

Lord Clark concluded on this ground of appeal: “In light of the full body of the evidence, we do not accept that there is a real possibility that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict and hence there was no miscarriage of justice arising from the non-disclosure itself. Their verdict was (unsurprisingly) unanimous. To reach a different decision would have involved the jury not accepting the many other convincing strands put forward in the Crown speech.”

He added on the ground of misdirection: “In terms of the jury manual, the sheriff gave the standard directions. The sheriff could have been clearer in his direction regarding the point in the Crown’s speech that there was a reasonable inference that the appellant got her friend to send this email. However, his directions to the jury were adequate.”

The appeal against conviction was therefore refused.