Former advocate John Watt loses appeal against convictions for historical sexual abuse based on establishing advocate paedophile ring

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2023] HCJAC 2
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary
• Judge:
  Lord Woolman

John Watt was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in respect of five charges, which related to complainers then aged between 7 and 13. Only one ground of appeal passed the sift, relating to two charges against complainer M, which was that the appellant ought to have been allowed to lead evidence under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 of the existence of other abusers.

The appeal was heard by Lord Woolman, Lord Pentland, and Lady Wise. DR Findlay KC and V Young, advocate, appeared for the appellant and the Solicitor General, Charteris KC, and Fyffe KC, solicitor advocate, for the Crown.

Risk of distraction

The account of events given by complainer M was that her late father, who had been a senior counsel at the Scots bar, had taken her to a property in the West End of Edinburgh in 1978 and left her with a man to whom he referred as “Watty”. This man, who she identified as the appellant at a VIPER and from a photograph from the 1980s, subjected her to sexual abuse. The appellant was convicted of one charge of lewd, libidinous and indecent practices towards M and another of rape.

Prior to the trial, the defence lodged an application seeking to lead evidence that M’s father had sexually abused her during her childhood and had headed a paedophile ring involving prominent members of the legal profession. Additionally, permission was sought to lead evidence that M had made allegations against individuals, not including the appellant, as early as 2000, and that the appellant did not meet M’s father until 1979 after his admission to the Faculty of Advocates.

The preliminary hearing judge allowed the appellant to elicit the evidence relating to the timing of M’s allegations as being relevant to her credibility, but that the evidence relating to M’s father and other possible abusers was either irrelevant at common law or prohibited by section 274 of the 1995 Act. Additionally, the evidence would run the risk of distracting or confusing the jury and was not relevant to establishing the appellant’s guilt.

Counsel for the appellant contended that he was deprived of a fair trial by not being allowed to elicit the evidence of M’s other abusers. If the jury accepted M as credible and reliable, the starting point was that there was a paedophile ring operating in Edinburgh in the 1970s, and the eminence of the other alleged abusers was such that it was inconceivable that they would include in their activities a junior solicitor, as the appellant was in 1978, with no identifiable connection to them.

Plainly collateral

Lord Woolman, delivering the opinion of the court, began by observing: “The section 275 case-law is now well developed. Each application should explain how the statutory requirements are met. It must set out the specific occurrence(s) of sexual behaviour about which the applicant proposes to lead evidence at trial; how it is relevant to guilt or innocence; and why its probative value outweighs the likely risk to the proper administration of justice. The defence application did not meet these tests in two important respects.”

He explained further: “First, it did not explain how the evidence in question was relevant to the appellant’s guilt on charges 1 and 2. The Crown did not suggest that the appellant was a member of any paedophile ring. Second, the application failed to address the requisite balance between the complainer’s dignity and privacy and the rights of the accused.”

Addressing the decision of the preliminary hearing judge in more detail, Lord Woolman said: “He correctly disallowed any evidence about a supposed paedophile ring. That was plainly collateral, irrelevant and inadmissible. It would have deflected the jury from its task. We conclude that the preliminary hearing judge reached a discerning decision . He did not impose a blanket prohibition. Instead, he allowed evidence that there had been a significant delay in M’s disclosures about the appellant.”

He concluded: “We are not persuaded that any unfairness arose from the section 275 decision. The appellant was able to advance his defence at trial. The jury were made aware (i) of the date that he commenced devilling, (ii) the particulars of the incriminee, and (iii) that he denied any sexual contact with M. That enabled senior counsel to explore the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in M’s evidence and to submit that she was an unreliable witness. There was therefore no miscarriage of justice.”

The appeal against conviction was therefore refused.