English High Court grants interim injunction in contractual dispute between boxing promoter and departing senior employee

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] EWHC 2386 (KB)
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  England and Wales High Court
• Judge:
  Mrs Justice Hill

Claimant Boxxer Ltd sought the order against defendant John Wischhusen, whom it claimed was still engaged under contract as its Head of Boxing, after he refused to give undertakings not to engage in certain boxing-related conduct without the claimant’s prior written consent. The defendant disputed the contractual position between the parties and sought to have the application determined based on a compromise offer he had made to the claimant.

The case was heard by Mrs Justice Hill, with Tom Cleaver appearing for the claimant and Ognjen Miletic for the respondent.

Document never finalised

The defendant’s contract originally ran from June to August 2020 and thereafter he continued to work for the claimant without a formal contract, which was evidenced to be typical in the world of boxing. Eventually he became an integral member of the claimant’s team and was a “key man” in a significant contract with Sky Sports agreed to run from 1 July 2021 until 30 June 2025.

In early August 2025, the defendant indicated that he wanted to leave the claimant. The claimant’s position was that it had recently become aware of evidence that the defendant had been working with others to launch a rival boxing venture in competition with the claimant and had deleted emails evidencing this. On 11 September 2025, a day before the hearing, the defendant filed a witness statement proposing a compromise position in which he would accept some restrictions on his conduct, but this offer was unacceptable to the claimant.

While an attempt was made to formalise the parties’ contract with a draft Consultancy Agreement drawn up in January 2024, this document was never finalised, signed or executed. Nonetheless, on the evidence of the claimant’s CEO and Head of Legal, the defendant proceeded on the basis that those terms had been agreed, with the modification that he was appointed personally rather than through a service company as the document initially envisaged.

The claimant’s case was that the defendant’s appointment was therefore on the terms as set out in the January document, including a non-compete obligation at clause 6.1.2 and obligations to promote the interests of the claimant and not to make representations to boxing promoters or fighters without its consent under clause 3.1. The defendant disputed that the document incorporated applicable terms into his contract and contented that he would not have agreed to the terms as set out in the draft, particularly the 24-month ban on boxing-related employment following termination under clause 6.2.

Enormously damaging

In her decision, Hill J referred to the principles for granting interim injunction under American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon (1975) and added: “It is well-established that the court will not exercise its discretion to enforce a contractual prohibition on working for another during a notice period if that would be tantamount to granting specific performance of the contract of service. However the question is whether the order would in fact compel the individual to return to work against his will, ‘not simply whether the employee will suffer some degree of hardship by being held to the negative obligations in his contract – and certainly not whether he will be prevented from earning his living during the period of the restraint’.”

She continued: “The evidence shows that if, during this important period, the Defendant was able to work actively against its interests or for the benefit of a competitor or potential competitor, that could be enormously damaging, not just because of the advantage it would give a competitor but also because of the damage it would cause to the stability and commercial reputation of the Claimant. Further, that danger is particularly serious if the Defendant is free to induce or persuade other employees of the Claimant to do the same.”

Noting that the claimant would continue to pay the defendant while the dispute was ongoing, Hill J said: “Mr Cleaver is right to contend that the risk of harm to the Defendant if it turns out that the injunction ought not to have been granted is at present relatively remote. I say this bearing in mind his high standing in the industry, as evidenced by the various testimonials he has provided, and the proposed expedited trial. As I have explained, the Claimant is better-resourced than the Defendant, and better able to pay any sum the court might in due course order it to pay. Accordingly, the risk of irremediable injustice to the Defendant involved in granting the injunction is plainly more remote and less than the risk of such harm to the Claimant if no injunction is granted.”

Considering whether the defendant’s proposed compromise would resolve the matter, she concluded: “As Mr Cleaver highlighted, the compromise offer effectively pre-supposes that the Defendant will set up in competition with the Claimant which is the very thing the injunction seeks to restrain. Ultimately the parties may decide to compromise the Claimant’s claim on terms along these lines. However I am satisfied that this compromise offer does not address the issues underpinning this injunction application and does not sufficiently “hold the ring” until trial.”

The court therefore granted the order sought by the claimant in the terms proposed.