Employment Appeal Tribunal remits anonymity issue over risk of identifying claimant’s disabled child

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2026] EAT 164
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Employment Appeal Tribunal
• Judge:
  His Honour Judge Auerbach

His Honour Judge Auerbach held that the employment tribunal had been entitled to refuse anonymity to the claimant, LMN, on the basis of her own Article 8 rights and security concerns. However, having separately granted anonymity to her child, referred to as A, it was required expressly to consider whether publication of LMN’s names would undermine that protection.

LMN appeared in person. Christopher Milsom, instructed by ARAG Law Limited, appeared for the respondents. The claimant was practising as a barrister and also sitting part-time as a Deputy District Judge at the relevant time. Her underlying employment tribunal claim concerns a decision by another set of chambers in February 2023 to refuse her application for an additional tenancy. She alleges sex discrimination and disability discrimination by association with her disabled child. The respondents defend the claim and no findings have yet been made on its merits.

Child granted anonymity

LMN used one surname in her personal life and another professionally. In February 2024 she applied for both herself and her child to be anonymised. Her application sought protection for her personal and professional names, information about her present and former chambers, the region in which she lived and practised, the nature of her child’s disability and details of where she sat as a Deputy District Judge. She argued that publication could enable her child to be identified and located and could compromise their privacy and personal security.

The respondents opposed anonymity for LMN but did not object to protection of the child’s name or details of the disability. At a preliminary hearing in November 2024, Employment Judge Power refused to anonymise the claimant but ordered that her child should be identified only as A. The tribunal also directed that information which could contribute to A’s identification should be withheld, including the child’s medical condition and home region. Because A’s home location was also LMN’s requested workplace, references to where the claimant lived and worked were to be replaced by “home region”.

In refusing anonymity to LMN in her own right, the tribunal gave full weight to open justice and freedom of expression. It found that she had not produced sufficient evidence of a particular security risk arising from the connection between her professional and personal identities. It also noted that her professional identity, chambers and judicial status were already public information.

The tribunal concluded that there was no cogent evidence establishing that disclosure of LMN’s own identity should be prohibited in the interests of justice, and that her Article 8 rights did not outweigh the principles of open justice and freedom of expression.

LMN appealed. Her principal argument was not ultimately that her status as a judicial officeholder gave her any special entitlement to privacy, but that publishing her identity could defeat the anonymity already granted to A. She argued that searchable online information concerning her professional and judicial roles could provide the links necessary for A to be identified through a combination of otherwise innocuous pieces of information.

Open justice decision upheld

The EAT first rejected LMN’s challenge to the refusal of anonymity insofar as it was based on her own privacy and security. Judge Auerbach held that the employment tribunal had properly concluded that there was insufficient specific evidence that the interference, or risk of interference, with LMN’s Article 8 rights outweighed the competing considerations of open justice and Articles 6 and 10.

Holding judicial office did not itself create any special right to anonymity. The tribunal had also been entitled to examine whether LMN faced a particular heightened security risk as a result of her position. She had been asked to provide clarification and supporting evidence, and the tribunal was entitled to take account of the absence of specific evidence demonstrating such a risk. Nor had it erred by taking account of the fact that LMN had chosen to bring proceedings knowing that employment tribunal litigation would ordinarily be heard and decided publicly.

The EAT referred to established principles governing derogations from open justice. The burden falls on the person seeking anonymity, and clear and cogent evidence is generally required. Tribunals must balance relevant Convention rights, commonly including Articles 6, 8 and 10, and apply a proportionality assessment. Parties should ordinarily expect their names to be public, and a wish to avoid embarrassment or publicity is not of itself sufficient to justify anonymity. However, the assessment remains fact-specific.

Jigsaw identification required separate consideration

The EAT nevertheless allowed the appeal on the issue concerning A.

Judge Auerbach accepted that the tribunal had considered the danger of jigsaw identification to some extent. It had protected not only A’s name and medical condition but also information about where A and LMN lived and where LMN worked. However, it had not expressly addressed whether the claimant’s personal or professional names also needed to be withheld in order to make the child’s anonymity effective. The judge said that the tribunal “did need expressly to address” that question.

There were two particular reasons.

First, LMN had issued the tribunal proceedings in her personal name, which was connected to A’s identity. That did not automatically mean her name had to be anonymised, but the tribunal needed to decide specifically whether withholding it was necessary despite the other protections already imposed. Secondly, LMN’s current professional surname differed from A’s surname, which might initially suggest that using it posed little risk. However, she explained that her previous use of another professional surname could provide a “stepping stone” connecting her current professional identity to A.

The respondents accepted that she had also explained that background to the employment tribunal. The EAT therefore held that the tribunal had to determine whether there remained a risk of jigsaw identification if either LMN’s personal or professional name were disclosed and, if there was such a risk, whether either or both names should be anonymised.

Judge Auerbach did not consider that the evidence permitted only one legally correct answer. The respondents were willing for the EAT itself to determine the outstanding questions, but LMN was not. They were therefore remitted to Employment Judge Power for reconsideration on the basis of the existing facts and information already provided to the tribunal.

As LMN requested a hearing, the EAT directed that one should take place, with the mode, timing and length to be determined by the employment judge.

The appeal was accordingly successful only to the extent that the employment tribunal had failed to complete its assessment of whether anonymising LMN’s names was necessary to prevent the jigsaw identification of A.