Christine Rolland

Two 2025 Sheriff Court decisions, Adam v Moneybarn No.1 Ltd and Suleman v One Insurance Ltd, highlight this point from opposite directions. Together, they offer practical guidance for solicitors who instruct experts and rely on their evidence at proof.

In Adam v Moneybarn No.1 Ltd, the sheriff accepted the expert’s qualifications and technical competence. The problem lay not in expertise, but in approach. The court found the evidence “vague”, resting on a “flimsy evidential basis” and involving a “leap in logical analysis”. More importantly, the sheriff gained the impression that the expert had reached a conclusion early and used the evidence to defend it.

For any expert, whether in accounting, engineering, medical practice or accident reconstruction, and their instructing solicitors, this is a familiar risk. Early assumptions can harden into fixed positions. Reports can be drafted defensively rather than analytically. And once a conclusion is committed to paper, the instinct to “hold firm” can take over.

From a litigation perspective, this is dangerous. A perceived lack of independence can undermine the weight attached to expert evidence and leave the court preferring the opposing expert’s reasoning.

The principle is not new. In Watt v Watt (2009), the Court of Session rejected an accountant’s valuation where the reasoning appeared outcome‑driven. Independence has always mattered, but recent cases show the courts are scrutinising it more closely.

By contrast, Suleman demonstrates what the courts value. The defender’s expert initially concluded that no collision had occurred. When presented with further material during evidence, he revised his opinion and accepted that contact was likely.

The sheriff did not view this as a weakness. On the contrary, he commended the expert’s candour and independence. The willingness to adjust his view strengthened his credibility.

This is a powerful reminder that a well‑judged concession can enhance an expert’s authority. It signals that the expert is responsive to the evidence, not anchored to an early assumption. This aligns with Kennedy v Cordia (2016), which emphasises that independence is an ongoing obligation, not a status conferred at the point of instruction.

These cases have practical implications for how expert evidence is prepared, tested and presented. Instructions should be framed to invite analysis, not conclusions and to encourage provisional thinking, especially in initial reports. New evidence should be addressed openly, whether through supplementary reporting or appropriate concession. And when preparing for proof, experts should be ready to explain changes in reasoning and to recognise when concession strengthens their opinion. Attempting to defend every point may have the opposite effect.

A final thought. The contrast between these cases can be summarised simply. In Adam v Moneybarn No.1 Ltd, the expert appeared fixed and was criticised. In Watt v Watt the evidence appeared outcome‑driven and was rejected. In Suleman v One Insurance Ltd the expert changed his mind and was praised.

The strongest expert is not the one who never moves, but the one whose reasoning is demonstrably shaped by the evidence. In the end, the most persuasive expert evidence is not advocacy, it is analysis the court can trust.

Christine Rolland is an expert witness and head of forensic accounting at Henderson Loggie