ATM proprietor loses Inner House challenge to assessor’s refusal to delete separate valuation
An appeal against a decision not to delete a separate valuation of the site of an external ATM outside of a post office in Stockbridge, Edinburgh, has been refused by the Inner House of the Court of Session after it determined that a 2020 Supreme Court decision offering guidance on the identification of the rateable occupier of ATMs in England did not constitute a material change of circumstances.
About this case:
- Citation:[2026] CSIH 3
- Judgment:
- Court:Court of Session Inner House
- Judge:Lord Malcolm
Appellant Waheeda Akram, the proprietor of the address at which the ATM was situated and tenant of the post office it was located outside of, challenged the refusal of an appeal against a decision of the Assessor for Lothian Valuation Joint Board. The assessor argued that the UKSC did not have the jurisdiction to decide questions of value in Scotland and the First-tier Tribunal was right to find the decision was not relevant.
The appeal was heard by Lord Malcolm, Lord Doherty, and Lord Ericht, with Ghosh KC appearing for the appellant and J Murphy, advocate, for the respondent.
Overall retail business
At the 2017 revaluation, the appeal subjects were entered into the valuation roll for Lothian as 72A Raeburn Place, Edinburgh, with a net annual value of £11,375. The subjects were formed in 2003 and previously had formed part of the shop premises at 72 Raeburn place, described in the roll as “Post Office” in 2017. The appellant was the tenant of these premises, which had an NAV of £13,400 following an amendment in 2018.
Due to the pandemic, the 2022 revaluation was postponed until 2023. On 12 February 2023, about six weeks before the 2023 roll became effective, the appellant appealed against the 2017 valuation of 72A on the ground that there had been a material change in circumstances affecting the value of the subjects. The appeal maintained that the entry for 72A should be deleted and the site included within the shop entry.
The assessor did not accept that there had been a material change of circumstances. The matter went to the Local Taxation Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland, with the principal issue on appeal being whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Cardtronics UK Ltd v Sykes (2020) constituted a material change of circumstances. The FTS held that Cardtronics was not a relevant decision in terms section 37 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975.
For the appellant it was submitted that Cardtronics made clear that where the retailer derived economic benefit from the ATM, and it could therefore be said to form part of their overall retail business, the retailer would be likely to be the paramount occupier. That valuation methodology ought to have been followed here, and it ought to have led to the conclusion that the appellant was the rateable occupier. The law and valuation principles applied ought not to differ between England and Scotland.
The respondent submitted that the UKSC was not a court specified in the second part of the relevant definition in section 37(1) of the 1975 Act. It was incorrect to assert that every aspect of the law of valuation for rating in Scotland and England were the same, and the FTT had given intelligible reasons for its decision.
Strictly limited exceptions
In an opinion with which the other judges agreed, Lord Doherty began: “It is clear from the decisions of this court in Assessor for Glasgow v Schuh Ltd (2012) and Schuh Ltd v Assessor for Glasgow (2013) that the definition of ‘material change of circumstances’ in section 37(1) ought not to be construed expansively, but should be given a purposive construction consistent with the policy of the Valuation Acts that generally, with only strictly limited exceptions, the valuation roll ought to be frozen between revaluations. The definition of ‘material change of circumstances’ requires to be construed as a whole, keeping sight of that policy.”
He added to this: “It is convenient to deal at this point with the submission that valuation for rating law and principles ought not to differ between Scotland and England. As a legal proposition, the submission is not well founded. The law of valuation for rating in Scotland and the other UK jurisdictions is governed by different legislation, and the apex court in Scotland on questions of value is the Lands Valuation Appeal Court.”
Considering the reasons given by the FTT, Lord Doherty said: “The facts found here were materially different from those found in Cardtronics. On a correct analysis, the payments made to the appellant by the bank represented the consideration paid for the use of the site and for the minor maintenance and replenishing services which the appellant provided. In so far as the payments were for the use of the site, the economic benefit to the appellant was of the same kind as the economic benefit to the hypothetical landlord from payment of the rent or other consideration under the hypothetical tenancy envisaged by section 6(8) of the Valuation for Rating (Scotland) Act 1956.”
He concluded: “The services which the appellant provided were of an ancillary nature. They did not interfere with the bank’s paramount occupation for its provision of banking services. In my opinion the criticisms of the FTT’s reasons are not well founded. The FTT gave adequate and intelligible reasons for their decision. As the appellant has failed to establish that the Cardtronics decision was a material change of circumstances affecting the value of the appeal subjects, the question of the effective date of such a change does not arise.”
The appeal was accordingly refused.



