Airdrie sheriff grants adoption application by single woman after determining parents incapable of promoting child’s welfare

About this case:

• Citation:
  [2025] SC AIR 71
• Judgment:
  External link
• Court:
  Sheriff Court
• Judge:
  Sheriff Anthony McGlennan

G, the anonymous petitioner, sought to adopt the child “Mary”, born in November 2020, and dispense with the consent of her parents on the basis of sections 31(3)(c) and (4) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007. The respondents opposed the application on the basis that adoption was not in Mary’s best interests, although in principle they did not object to the petitioner being her carer.

The application was heard by Sheriff Anthony McGlennan in Airdrie Sheriff Court, with Mackenzie, solicitor, appearing for the petitioner, Trainer, advocate, for the first respondent E and Hughes, advocate, for the second respondent F.

Severing familial ties

In November 2021, the petitioner, who was employed in a senior role in the school education sector, contacted her local authority to request they act as her adoption agency. After an initial meeting with a member of the family placement team and other preparatory sessions, G was readily recommended to adopt a child between three and six years of age. Following her meeting with G, Mary was received into G’s care in April 2024.

The respondents married in 2018 and prior to Mary they had another child together, “James”, who had been placed in foster care. Their relationship was found to have until recently been characterised by volatility and frequent periods of separation. At a pre-birth child protection conference for Mary, a unanimous decision was taken to place her on the register under the risk category of neglect. At the time of Mary’s birth, E and F were living apart, and there had been no direct contact between F and Mary since May 2022.

Evidence was given by Karen Jaskot of the family placement team that G and Mary had a positive developing relationship and that Mary had benefited hugely from the consistent and predictable parenting that G had provided. Mary had talked about living with G until she was “a very old lady”. After it became clear that social work services did not intend to return James and Mary to their care, the respondents made improvements in their lives and had been able to live together without interruption since some point in 2023.

It was the respondents’ position that statutory basis to dispense with their consent had not been made out. While they did accept that it would no longer be appropriate for Mary to return to their care and that G was a suitable person to act as their carer, they asked the court to consider the effect of severing familial ties, and led evidence from an independent social worker, Ruth Stark, in support of their improved position.

Opposition was misguided

In his decision, Sheriff McGlennan said of the position of the respondents: “I accepted that E and F had made significant changes in their lifestyles. That is laudable and shows no little fortitude on their part. However, it is a quite different thing from displaying that they are, or will be, able to discharge their responsibilities and rights. Firstly, the improvements are relatively recent. Secondly it cannot be said that the improvements are parenting improvements per se.”

He explained further: “There was no independent reliable source of evidence to suggest that E and F were now able to parent. Ruth Stark’s assessment and report (which I was not willing to attach weight to in its material findings) stopped short of advancing that position. In broad brush terms, it advocated a wait and see approach. The difficulty with that is that I must look at what the foreseeable future holds. I was satisfied that the evidence did not suggest that E and F would be capable of discharging their parental responsibilities and rights in that time frame.”

Considering whether an adoption order was necessary, the sheriff said: “Mary, not yet 5 years of age, has had no contact with her birth parents for over 3 years. The tie that exists is, sadly, minimal. The evidence was that Mary seems presently without any real knowledge of E and F. Her connection to her birth parents, her sense of identity, her sense of self can each be nurtured and developed by life story work and by indirect contact conditions. The loss to Mary by the severing of the family tie does not outweigh the benefit that would be obtained by adoption.”

He concluded: “I wish to conclude this note by returning to a point previously made, to emphasise a matter I would wish Mary, should she read this judgment in later years, to be clear upon. E and F could not provide her with the care she needs and I was satisfied that would continue to be the case. I was equally satisfied that only adoption could secure her welfare. The opposition to the adoption was misguided, but it was motivated by what E and F thought was in her best interests. Their evidence, often poignant, also recognised the importance of her loving relationship with G, and G’s ability to care for her. The process, and granting, of her adoption, therefore took place against a backdrop whereby she was loved by all parties.”

The sheriff therefore dispensed with the consent of the respondents and made an adoption order in favour of G, with the respondents entitled to provide a letter update for Mary once a year.