There are many and various reasons for delay. When a sheriff orders a series of supervised sessions at an accredited contact centre, for example, they may not always be aware that in some parts of Scotland there can be a months long wait for a space to become free.

We regularly hear that an order has been made for a specialist report to be provided by a child psychologist. The report would not be ordered if the sheriff did not believe it was essential to his or her assessment of the child’s future welfare. Getting under the surface of the pressure that may influence a child’s perspective is specialist work.

However, there isn’t a cab rank of competent child psychologists free and waiting to be whistled up. There can be a delay of months before one can begin work on a new case.

A recent case [A.C. v D.C. [2026] IEHC 98] decided by the High Court in Ireland should at least give the Scottish judiciary and legal profession food for thought. The details don’t read directly across, but the decision that justice and fairness shouldn’t wait for market forces to catch up could be a useful approach in the overall context of some cases.

Coverage of the decision, such as it has been, has focussed on the parties who were same sex parents. The six year old child, Z, had been conceived through surrogacy.

The ‘respondent’ was the biological father. The judgment set out that he enjoyed a successful career in his profession, and the ‘applicant’ was a stay at home dad in the context of their family.

The relationship ended during the summer of 2025. The applicant, who had modest resources, moved back in with his parents who lived some distance from the home where the parties and child had lived together.

The parties settled into a routine by Autumn 2025 in respect of the care of the child. However, in November 2025, the applicant learned that the respondent was in a new relationship and an exchange took place following which the respondent decided that the applicant should not have further access to Z.

The applicant issued proceedings in December 2025, including a motion seeking inter alia interim access to the child and directions in terms of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 in relation to obtaining an expert report on the child.

The parties agreed that the court could make an order for a report from an agreed professional on the welfare of the child and to determine and convey the child’s views. However, the respondent then argued that there could not be any contact until the professional report had been produced to the court.

In the High Court, Mr Justice Quinn considered the relevant principles of statutory interpretation within the 1964 Act are the “paramount consideration” for the court in any access application is the “best interests of the child” (principles analogous to those in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995).
He observed that the applicant had not seen the child for over three months, a significant period in the context of the amount of contact prior, and the age of the child.

Mr Justice Quinn recognised that “the Applicant, while not a natural parent, has performed, for a substantial period of the life of the child, the role of a parent. He had been living with the child in a capacity similar to that of a natural parent. He was there for the child’s birth and the child being raised and navigating the various milestones of life and in addition has performed the ordinary function of a parent in the context of the day-to-day routine of the child.”

Noting that an expert report could take several months to obtain, Mr Justice Quinn found that it could not be in the paramount interests of a child that in practice “they could be deprived of access to a person who has been in a quasi-parental role with them without all of the circumstances being considered”.

The ‘best interests of the child’ principle the Act “does not envisage an absolutist position” which would preclude a court from making an interim access order in advance of a professional report being available.

Interim contact was awarded.